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In this dissertation, a state-contingent, principal-agent model is developed to
examine the institution of input provision by a corporate rm that contracts with
agents for the production of a given commodity. "Input provision" entails not
only the provision and delivery of key inputs by the principal but also their pur-
chases (or in-house production), as well as contract design to ensure their optimal
use.
The provision of key inputs is modeled in the context of production contracts
for poultry and pork, such as those o¤ered by Perdue Farms, Smitheld Foods,
and Tyson Foods in the United States. The decision in question is the levels
of inputs (e.g. feed, medication) that the contracting company provides to the
farmer. This decision is endogenous to the model, and facilitates comparison of
production contracts (input provision) with marketing contracts (no input pro-
vision, with all inputs purchased and/or provided by the farmer himself).
The theoretical model formalizes Coases idea that an institutional arrangement
emerges if the benets associated with it exceed the costs. In particular, I char-
acterize the case of no input provision as a corner solution for the optimal choice
of inputs provided. The extent of input provision, in turn, reects "limits to rm
size". I also examine conditions under which incentives relating to one of two
output dimensions (produced by the agent) tend to zero, when both dimensions
are observable and veriable. The state-contingent approach is used as it allows
for a general production technology, and the inclusion of transaction costs in a
general theoretical model.
The possibility of reservation utility being endogenous in dyadic relationships is
also examined. This is explored formally by incorporating pre-contract interac-
tions in a contractual framework with the principal and the agent competing as
independent producers prior to contracting. Investment decisions of the princi-
pal in this framework favorably impact his variable costs both as an independent
producer and as the principal party to a contract. I show that the higher these
benets, the stronger is the incentive for the principal to decide in favor of higher
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Introduction
The research question that this dissertation addresses is the following: In a
principal-agent setting, where the principal contracts with an agent(s) to produce
a given commodity, what incentive does the principal have to provide the agent(s)
with the inputs that play a key role in the production process? This thesis is a
contribution to the economics of institutions - the institution of input provision in
particular.1 Input provisionhere refers not only to the provision and delivery
of key inputs by the principal but also their purchases (or in-house production),
as well as contract design to ensure that the agent uses them optimally.
The provision of key inputs in this thesis is modeled in the context of produc-
tion contracts (PCs) for poultry and pork, such as those o¤ered by Perdue Farms,
Smitheld Foods, and Tyson Foods in the United States (U.S.).2 As a matter of
fact, the production of chicken and/or pork in the U.S. today is almost entirely
or increasingly being undertaken through the organizational arrangements that
underlie PCs. These contracts are agreements where, a contracting company, for
example, contracts with a group of growers (or farmers) whose role is to grow
1It also contributes to Contract Theory and Applied Microeconomics in general.
2PCs are also used for crops like corn and soybean in the U.S. and green peas in Denmark.
For countries like India, contract farming through production contracts is a more recent phe-
nomenon primarily applicable in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil
Nadu, and West Bengal. While I use the structure of organization in American meat producing
companies as the point of reference, the results obtained in the thesis can also be extended
to other production contract operations. Further, the specic kind of pork and/or broiler PC
that I focus on is the nishing contract that involves growing animals to slaughter weight. As
applied to PCs for crops, the contract would entail the growers involvement from the planting
stage till the point the plants are ready for harvest.
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chickens or hogs to market weight. What is unique about these contracts is the
fact that the key inputs to be used by the growers in the production process, such
as feed, antibiotics, and animals, are provided by the contracting company. Input
provision of this kind allows for considerable control of production practices by
contracting companies, through the choice of feed quality, antibiotics, and ge-
netic lines. This is in contrast to other contractual arrangements in the industry,
namely, marketing contracts (MCs), where a growers inputs are self-provided
and/or self-purchased.
Input provision by the principal through PCs also bears historic resemblance
to the early phase of the putting out system that characterized precapitalist
Europe. In this system, raw materials were provided by a merchant to craftsmen
who, in turn, worked these into the nal product in their own workshops mostly
using their own tools. The product at all stages of production was owned by the
merchant.
In this dissertation, I develop a state-contingent principal-agent model to
analyze the institution of input provision through production contracts as against
no input provision typical of marketing contracts. Within this framework, the
possibility of reservation utility being endogenous is also examined and is the
main focus of Chapter 4. The model of the dissertation is set in a production-
theoretic setting and incorporates fundamental principles of production theory
under uncertainty. Overall, this production-theoretic state-contingent approach
has the advantage of allowing for a su¢ ciently general and rational representation
of the production technology with multiple inputs and state-contingent outputs,
in contrast to the existing mainstream literature on contracts and institutions.
For a formal exposition to this approach and its comparison with the traditional
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approach, see Chambers and Quiggin (2000).
The main model is a multi-task model where the agent is engaged in the
production of two outputs a quantity dimension (weight gain), and a quality
dimension (leanness). An important characteristic of the model is that both out-
puts produced by the grower are observable and measurable. This is in contrast
to the multi-task model developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) where
some aspects of performance are not measurable thereby causing the agent to
substitute attention away from these tasks to those that can be measured and
are rewarded. A multitask analysis using the state-contingent approach can be
found in Chambers and Quiggin (1996) where they look at the design of an in-
surance mechanism that provides incentives with respect to corn production and
chemical runo¤.
A signicant issue in the dissertation is the representation of the produc-
tion technology. The mainstream literature in general is based on a production
function approach which leads to a Leontief representation of the production
technology (See Chambers and Quiggin, 2000). In regards to the literature on
broiler and pork contracts particularly relevant for this thesis, Tsoulouhas and
Vukina (1999) specify a production technology originally outlined by Knoeber
and Thurman (1994). The latter assumed that if ock size and the target mar-
ket weight are the same for all growers, they will also produce roughly the same
number of pounds so that weight gain can be treated as non stochastic. Even
though Tsoulouhas and Vukina recognize early on in their paper that growers
e¤ort stochastically inuence both feed utilization and weight gain, their model
has e¤ort a¤ecting only the former. Thus, the growersperformance is based
only on feed utilization with the target output being the same for all the growers.
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In other words, weight gain is non stochastic while feed utilization is stochastic.
This explains why in their result, the optimal contract is based only on one signal
- feed utilization. The importance of weight gain in the problem of hidden action
and incentives is not addressed. However, given the fact that live weight does
gure in the actual contract, one must recognize that there must be incentive
issues associated with this. The dissertation directly addresses this issue, and at
the same time, also addresses incentive issues associated with quality measured
in terms of lean percentage.
The dissertation is organized into four chapters - Chapter 1 provides the in-
stitutional background of the main theme namely, production and marketing
contracts in corporate agriculture, addressed in the thesis. This is followed by
chapter 2 that provides a review of the current literature. Chapter 3 is a technical
analysis of the institution of input provision in hybrid contracts modeled in ref-
erence to production contracts and marketing contracts in agriculture. Chapter
4 examines the possibility and implications of endogenous reservation utility in
the framework developed in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 5 concludes and compiles





Production contracts (PCs) have emerged as an important means of coordi-
nating production of certain agricultural commodities in the United States (U.S.).
Such contracts are a common feature in the broiler and hog industries but are
also used for crops like corn and soybean. While PCs may be in use in agricul-
tural areas other than livestock, the main focus in this dissertation is on hog and
broiler production contracts.
PCs assume di¤erent forms based on what stage of production they correspond
to. Hog production, for instance, involves four specialized phases: 1) breeding
and gestation; 2) farrowing (birth of a litter up to the weaning stage); 3) nursery
(care after weaning until the hogs weigh 30-80 pounds), and 4) nishing (feeding
hogs weighing 30-80 pounds until they reach slaughter weight of 225-300 pounds).
As such, contracts signed with growers may involve di¤erent stages of production:
a) farrow-to-weanling (phases 1 and 2); b) weanling-to-feeder pig (phase 3); c)
farrow-to-feeder pig (phases 1, 2 and 3); d) feeder pig-to-nish (phase 4), and
e) farrow-to-nish (all 4 phases). (McBride and Key, 2003). The specic kind
of PC that I focus on is the nishing contract that involves growing animals to
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slaughter weight. Both d) and e) correspond to nishing contracts.
What is unique about PCs as against other contracts in agriculture is the
presence of an integrator - a rm (e.g. Perdue Farms, Smitheld Foods, Tyson
Foods), or a cooperative (e.g. Farmland Industries) or a large farmer - that con-
trols more than one stage of production. The integrator, in turn, establishes a
contractual relationship with a grower (or the "farmer", in the context of agricul-
ture in general) to produce a specied commodity. The contract terms delineate,
among other things, the obligations of both the integrator and the grower with
respect to the provision of di¤erent inputs, as well as the payment schedule to
determine grower compensation (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 1999).
The broiler industry on the Eastern Shore in the U.S., for instance, is an indus-
try almost entirely vertically integrated through production contracts.1 The main
players in the region include companies like Alan, Mountaire, Perdue, and Tyson
Foods. Of these, Mountaire grows roasters (used in Kentucky Fried Chicken,
Golden Crown, and the supermarket) that grow larger in size as compared to
broilers. While a broiler matures in about 6 weeks and weighs about 5.5 pounds,
a 9 pound roaster takes about 9 weeks to mature. Each company contracts with
a number of growers who are required to grow the chicks to market weight.
As Nerlove (1996) notes: Todays large scale poultry operations grew from
the feed suppliers who ultimately integrated their business with the production
and marketing of the nal product to take advantage of new technology in mar-
keting, genetics and poultry nutrition.John Tyson, Founder of Tyson Foods, for
instance, initially had a trucking business and made a living hauling hay, fruit,
1The details of the broiler industry in the Eastern Shore are based on the authors personal
interaction with local growers in the region.
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and chickens for local growers. He then bought a hatchery (due to his chick sup-
pliers refusal to supply birds) and also started milling his own feed (when supply
of feed from the local feed mill was delayed). In 1943, the company invested in a
broiler farm in Arkansas (Source Webpage shown in Appendix A).
A key feature of PCs that this dissertation emphasizes is the fact that the
crucial inputs in the production process are provided by the company in question.
These inputs include the chicks or hogs, feed, bedding and litter (comprising
sawdust), fuel (e.g. propane gas) for heating, technical and veterinary help,
managerial guidelines and, as one grower of the Eastern Shore revealed, interest
free credit for renovation and upgrade. The delivery and removal of animals to
and from the growers facility are also taken care of by the integrator company
that usually owns the hatcheries (in the case of broilers), and the processing
plant. Similarly, the integrator is responsible for the transportation of feed that
typically comes from its own feed mills in which raw grain is mixed with vitamins,
minerals and other nutrients. (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 1999; inputs received
from growers of the Eastern Shore). Decisions over genetics are made by the
integrator company through wholly-owned subsidiaries (e.g. Cobb Vantress, in
the case of Tyson Foods division producing chicken) or by contracting with genetic
companies (e.g. Pig Improvement Company, Babcock Genetics, Inc.).
The task of raising the chicks or hogs to market weight is performed by the
growers. The grower, on his part, provides labor, land, the building (chicken house
or the hog barn), and equipment (ancillary and necessary). He is further required
to make proper provisions for utilities (electricity, heat and water), maintenance,
adequate ingress and egress, manure management and dead animal disposal for
the duration of the contract. (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 1999; inputs received from
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growers of the Eastern Shore).
The experience of the Eastern Shore growers I spoke to ranged from 10 to
30 years. Not all growers interviewed engaged in chicken farming as a primary
activity. Their primary occupations ranged from being an educationist to being
employed in a tractor company to being an investment professional. Not much
time went into supervision of the birds. Technology has given the growers an
edge in the sense that growers, after installing a computer-based controller in the
chicken house, can monitor their chicken-houses sitting anywhere in the world
from their computers.
Alternatives to the PC mode of organization include independent production
and marketing, and production under a marketing contract (MC). Independent
production and marketing entails self-purchase and/or provision of inputs by the
grower, and the sale of the product in the open market to the party willing to pay
the highest price. A MC species the quantity and quality of slaughter hogs to
be delivered by the grower at a future date in accordance with a specic pricing
schedule as outlined in the contract. Unlike PCs, marketing contracts do not
involve the provision of inputs by the contracting company to the grower - inputs
are purchased and/or provided by the grower himself as is true in independent
production. However, the company may provide certain guidelines relating to
feeding and/or the choice of genetic strain, or may require the grower to obtain
prior approval by the company in making these choices. Some MCs, in fact, may
just require the growers actions to be consistent with good animal husbandry
thereby allowing for su¢ cient freedom relating to production practices (Martinez
and Zering, 2004). Thus, an important advantage that MCs and independent
production have over PCs is that they leave the growers with considerable auton-
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omy in everyday production decisions. This aspect is important as some growers
may attach substantial value to independent decision making.
The Compensation Side
Payments under production contracts are made as per a xed performance
(applicable to hogs only) or a relative performance (applicable to both hogs and
broilers) payment schedule. In the latter case, growers can be said to be par-
ticipating in "tournaments". Alternatively, the latter also resembles area-yield
insurance contracts where the indemnity is based on the aggregate yield of a risk
pool and not on any individual producers yield (Chambers and Quiggin, 2002).
Under a xed or absolute performance production contract (APPC), the total
payment made to the grower consists of two parts  a xed payment and an
incentive payment, both of which are subject to review and can be adjusted
upward or downward during the contract period. The xed payment is a xed
sum paid out periodically during the term of the contract and may, in some
contracts, be specied on a per animal growing facility basis. While the incentive
payment is determined in di¤erent ways in di¤erent contracts, I shall use the
example of the incentive payment used by Land OLakes, Inc. (a swine contract
from 1997) because this is also the one most commonly found in the literature
on broiler and hog contracts (See attachment; source for contract document -
www.iowaattorneygeneral.org). The incentive payment used by Land OLakes
consists of two parts: (a) a base payment calculated as the base pay per pound of
weight gain times the total number of pounds gained, and (b) a bonus calculated
as the deviation of the facilitys feed e¢ ciency from a base feed e¢ ciency times
the piece or bonus rate times the total number of pounds gained. The feed
e¢ ciency or the feed conversion ratio (FCR) is dened as the total number of
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pounds of feed used divided by the total number of pounds of weight gain. It is a
measure of performance and is indicative of how e¢ ciently the feed is used. The
facilitys actual FCR is compared with a base FCR (a predetermined technological
standard (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 1999)) that varies from company to company,
for the purpose of determining the total bonus per pound.
While hog PCs tend to be of the absolute performance variety, broiler con-
tracts tend to be of the relative performance kind. Payment under a relative
performance production contract (RPPC) also consists of a xed payment as
dened under APPC. However, the incentive component is now determined dif-
ferently. While a base payment is still made in the same way as in APPC, the
bonus is now calculated by comparing the FCR of the facility not with a base
FCR, but with the average FCR of the entire group of growers that harvest their
ocks around the same time period. For instance, the average feed conversion
ratio of the broiler farms in my study of the Eastern Shore was about 2.0.
Payments to broiler growers of the Eastern Shore are largely based on weight
gain and feed conversion ratio. Often, companies may also include fuel usage,
mortality, and bruising of birds as product characteristics relevant for determining
payment. In general, there is a tier system under which payments are directly
related to how technologically advanced a chicken house is. This, in turn, requires
growers to invest, from time to time, in state-of-the-art equipment as outlined by
the contracting company. Renovation and upgrade entail incurring expenditures
on recirculation pads, tunnel fans, radiant heaters, tunnel curtains, computer
based controllers and so on.
Now, the compensation in a marketing contract involves providing incentives
both with respect to weight gain and quality (leanness) unlike PCs where quality
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based incentives typically tend to be absent. Payment associated with quality
under an MC is based on a carcass merit program that species carcass pricing
grids. The payment for weight gain may be made in one of the following ways (in
contrast to absolute or relative performance based payments in PCs): (a) it may
be a xed price tied to the costs of production (for e.g. soybean meal and corn
prices), or (b) the price may be tied to the one prevailing in a publicly quoted
market, or (c) a price window may be specied within which the contract price
will be the same as the market price, but if, for example, the market price is
greater than the maximum price specied in the price window, their di¤erence
will be shared between the two parties.
Rationale for Input Provision
The provision of feed and other inputs by the integrator in a PC carries a
number of advantages for both the integrator and the grower. [Note that some
of the arguments made below are similar to the benets outlined by Bardhan
(1989) as a justication for interlinked rural economic arrangements in developing
countries]:
1. Input provision on the part of the integrator decreases price risk for the
grower thus leading to a more predictable cash ow.2 Payments under PCs
are such that prices (hog/broiler, feed and so on) do not enter at all, at
2The risk borne by growers is of two kinds: price risk and production risk. Price risk
originates from both stochastic input and output prices. As far as production risk is concerned,
Knoeber and Thurman (1995) note, "Part of the production risk is idiosyncratic and a¤ects only
a single producer (if, for example, an automatic feeder breaks down), but part is common and
therefore a¤ects many producers (if, for example, the ambient air temperature becomes very
high." Note that the common production risk applies only for farmers located in a particular
geographical area.
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least not explicitly. This, in turn, shifts price risk from the growers to the
integrator. Payments based on absolute or relative performance, in turn,
a¤ect the extent to which growers face production risk. Under an absolute
performance production contract (APPC), growers face both the common
and idiosyncratic components of production risk. However, if payments are
based on a relative performance production contract (RPPC), they face the
idiosyncratic portion of the production risk and only some portion of the
common production risk. This is because bonuses under RPPCs are based
on relative production outcomes so that any production risk that a¤ects
all growers bunched together in one geographical area will not signicantly
a¤ect the bonus for a given grower as would be the case when performance
is compared with a xed standard. With base payments still being sub-
ject to variability on account of common production risk, one can conclude
that RPPCs partially protect the growers from production risk of this kind.3
Knoeber and Thurman (1995) and Martin (1997) use risk sharing to ex-
amine the rationale for coordinating production through PCs. Risk in this
literature has been assessed in terms of variability in grower income.4 Us-
ing simulation methods, three mechanisms of livestock production have
been analyzed - independent production and marketing, APPCs and RP-
PCs. Knoeber and Thurman nd that RPPC production shifts nearly 84%
3As far as marketing contracts (MCs) are concerned, they leave the grower free of only
output price risk and, in some instances, input price risk.
4However, it should be noted that this is not a proper measure of risk as it is the variability
in consumption that is important. While the two measures may be the same, this may not be
true given large asset holdings
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of risk from broiler growers to integrator companies as compared to inde-
pendent production where the producer bears all risk. Martin compares
APPCs with independent production in the pork industry and nds the
income variability of pork growers to be reduced signicantly by about 90%
upon entering into APPCs with the integrator company. As far as the com-
parison of RPPCs with APPCs is concerned, Knoeber and Thurman nd
that risk reduction through compensation by tournaments is statistically
signicant for 78% of broiler growers. However, the evidence that RPPCs
further reduce income variability as against APPCs is not strong enough
in Martins study of hog contracts with reduction in income variability be-
ing statistically signicant for 36.4%, 51.9% and 70% growers under three
di¤erent simulated RPPC scenarios.
2. Contracting through a PC reduces transaction costs for both the integrator
and the grower. Transaction costs here include both neoclassical production
costs and costs associated with negotiating and administering an ongoing
production relationship (Joskow, 1985).Outside of the PC arrangement, it
is possible that a hog or broiler grower may incur signicant costs asso-
ciated with searching, for instance, low cost feed sources and deciding on
the appropriate feed mixtures that would maximize expected return. With
integrator companies having their own feed mills and devoting a large part
of research expenditures to designing feed mixes, contracting enables grow-
ers to allocate more time to other production decisions. The integrator
company also gains from input provision because it may be able to obtain
inputs, bought in bulk, at lower prices due its size or power.
3. As Netanyahu, Mitra and Just (1995) point out, input provision reduces
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the magnitude of the moral hazard problem by decreasing the number of
unobservable inputs. It also allows the integrator company to choose the
quality of the inputs that it provides in a way that maximizes expected
prots. 5
4. Finally, the incentive to provide key inputs may be inspired by a desire
to bring out a uniform product quality to the market to facilitate easier
marketing and monitoring of the growers, or to cater to the tastes of con-
sumers in terms of product characteristics desired by them. As a matter
of fact, the whole process of production is such that the role of Nature is
reduced (though not eliminated) when animals are reared in connement
under highly controlled conditions to check climate and disease. As Allen
and Lueck (2002) note, The introduction of antibiotics and other drugs
have allowed poultry to be bred, hatched, and grown in highly controlled
indoor environments in which disease, climate, food, water, and vitamins
and other inputs are regulated to the point where poultry barns are virtu-
ally assembly lines.This aspect, along with gains from specialization are
important factors in explaining the move to factory farming in livestock
production (Allen and Lueck, 2002). Production can now be organized
along textbook lines as there is less dependence on location-specic factors
such as land and managerial human capital. In particular, the corporate
5However, there also arises, a possible two-sided moral hazard problem (Netanyahu, Mitra
and Just, 1995). On the one hand, growers feeding schedules and other activities may not
be in line with the expectation of the integrator as their actions may be taken so as to only
maximize their own utilities. On the other hand, the integrator may compromise on the care
of chicks or quality of chicks provided or might try to economize on the costs per chick (e.g. in
terms of quality of inputs like feed).
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form of organization is characterized by the separation of the management
function from the ownership of the factors of production so that decisions
requiring intimate knowledge of disease, genetics, feed and so on are no
longer made by an individual grower (Nerlove, 1996).
The growers of the Eastern Shore whom I spoke to were also of the view that
input provision was essential for bringing out the quantity and the quality (lean
and uniform quality chicken) as necessitated by market conditions. The provision
of key inputs ensured better biosecurity, and better control of the quality of chicks
and feed rations. Further, with the specialized stages involved in the production
process, the growers felt that it would be very costly to produce on their own.
They felt that the contracting companies, undertaking extensive research and
development, were in a better position to handle these specialized stages. It was
also felt that the company, was in a better position to obtain or produce inputs
at a lower cost. All of this feedback from the growers conrms the points made
above in favor of input provision.
On the downside, the monopsony power of the integrator may lead to a kind
of captive interlinking of transactions, with virtually all-or-nothing choices for the
weaker partners. This is an issue that I address in Chapter 4. These contracts may
also potentially lower on-farm productivity if they reduce incentives for growers
to work e¢ ciently or to invest fully in specic productive assets (Bardhan, 1989).
Some growers of the Eastern Shore, for instance, expressed concern about
renovation being too costly even though it made them eligible for a higher return
under the tier system. According to some growers, it is almost always the case
that when one company introduces a new technology, the others have a tendency
to follow suit even when the adoption of the new technology may not make a
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big di¤erence to productivity. Ultimately, it is the grower who may su¤er in the
process of his company jumping on the bandwagon. They were also of the view
that one cannot be too mechanical in farming and that the company should trust
their judgement a little more about on-farm decisions. For instance, the grower
may feel that the birds need medication but the company may think otherwise.
Giving the growers the benet of the doubt may be of value given that it is they
who are directly associated with the production process. Finally, some growers
felt that they could manage the bedding and litter on their own and wouldnt
mind paying for their own litter.
Challenges have also emerged with the trend towards antibiotic-free meat is
gaining popularity. Perdue Farms, for instance, gets a premium on the market
for its antibiotic-free chicken. However, growers may experience increased bird
mortality on account of this trend where, unless there is a major outbreak of
disease, it is preferable to have a dead bird than encourage the use of antibiotics.
The growers I spoke to therefore felt that they should be adequately compensated
as an increase in the mortality rate a¤ects their payment.
Overall, PCs, as can be inferred from the pattern of input provision, repre-
sent a high degree of vertical coordination unlike alternative modes of market
organization in the industry that include independent production and marketing
(or no contract), and production under a marketing contract. These alternative
forms of organization are mostly relevant for hog production because the broiler
industry is almost entirely vertically coordinated through production contracts.
As a matter of fact, both production contracts and marketing contracts fall
under the category of hybrid organizations that are a mix of two extremes, namely
markets and hierarchies, and range from loose clusters of rms to quasi-integrated
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rms. These can be described as . . . arrangements among legally autonomous
entities doing business together, mutually adjusting with little help from the price
system, and sharing or exchanging technologies, capital, products, and services,
but without a unied ownership(Menard, 2004). As pointed out by Williamson
(1991), and Coase (1988), these hybrid forms constitute the more common and
dominant form of conducting business.
While there is a diverse set of arrangements that falls in the category of hy-
brid organizations, Menard (2004) identies certain regularities in these thereby
suggesting an underlying pattern that captures all hybrid forms. First, organiza-
tion in any hybrid form is characterized by resource pooling that entails, among
other things, a sort of joint planning requiring cooperation and coordination with
respect to inputs, quality standards, prices, quantities and so on. Second, the
relationships among participating entities in hybrid forms are regulated through
contracting. Herein, hybrids pose a challenge in that contracts should minimize
costly or even impossible negotiations or renegotiations. Finally, as is true for
organization within a rm and/or hierarchy, hybrid arrangements are also shaped
under the pressure of competition. However, as Menard notes, The fundamental
di¤erence in hybrids is that partners remain independent residual claimants with
full capacity to make autonomous decisions as a last resort.
This thesis identies input provision by the contracting company as the chief
distinguishing characteristic of PCs. This organizational feature also bears his-
toric resemblance (as also observed in Menard, 2006) to the early phase of the
putting out system that characterized precapitalist Western Europe. The putting
out system rst developed around the 16th century mainly in the textile indus-
tries and marked the onset of capitalism in the towns. Under this system, the
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merchant-capitalist provided raw materials to a craftsman who, in turn, worked
in an independent workshop (with his own tools, in most cases) and transformed
the raw materials into the nished product for a fee. The ownership of the prod-
uct, throughout all stages of production, was concentrated in the hands of the
capitalist. The putting out system was built over and replaced traditional hand-
icraft production where the craftsman functioned as an independent, small-scale
entrepreneur, and owned not only the tools and the workshop but also the raw
materials (Hunt, 2004; Lazerson,1995). Production under PCs and MCs can be





The technical analysis in the dissertation is organized as two chapters - "Input
Provision in Hybrid Contracts - The Case of Corporate Agriculture" and "Eco-
nomic Power and Endogenous Reservation Utility in Corporate Dyads". In what
follows, I review the current state of the literature for each one of the two analyses.
2.1 Literature review for "Input Provision in
Hybrid Contracts - The Case of Corporate
Agriculture" (Chapter 3)
"Input Provision in Hybrid Contracts - The Case of Corporate Agriculture" ex-
amines the rationale behind the institution of input provision under contract.
This chapter emphasizes that this institutional arrangement is largely a response
to changing market conditions and consumer preferences for lean meat or a supe-
rior product quality in general. In particular, I show that the likelihood of input
provision under a production contract increases with an increase in the principals
market premium per unit of the quality dimension of output, and with a decrease
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in the principals costs of obtaining an input, other things remaining the same.
Formally, the case of no input provision is characterized by a corner solution for
the optimal choice of inputs. That is, there is an incentive for the principal to
provide inputs under a production contract if at the boundary, where no inputs
are provided, the marginal benets of input provision exceed the marginal costs.
In the context of the rm as an institution, Coase (1937) attributes its emer-
gence to costs associated with using the price mechanism or the market. In
particular, if all the relevant prices are not known, it may be more e¢ cient to
organize factors of production through the rm rather than the market. My the-
oretical model formalizes, in a production-theoretic setting, Coases (1937, 1991)
idea that an institutional arrangement will materialize if the benets associated
with it exceed the costs. The weighing of costs against benets in my model also
reects limits to rm size as outlined by Coase (1937). In this respect, Coase
(1937) maintains that a rm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an
extra transaction within the rm become equal to the costs of carrying out the
same transaction through the open market. In a similar vein, Alchian and Dem-
setz (1972) attribute joint input production in teams to the benets associated
with cooperative specialization realized through team activity. This is provided
that the net increase in productivity through team activity outweighs the costs
of metering input productivity and determining individual rewards in accordance
with productivity.
The main theme of this chapter, namely, input provision, can also be viewed
in terms of allocation of decision rights where the decision in question is made
by the principal as to what inputs he should provide the agent for production.1
1A decision right, according to Jensen and Meckling (1992), is dened as "the right to decide
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If he chooses not to provide certain inputs, the corresponding input choices are
then made by the agent. The degree of vertical integration, and the degree of
centralization or decentralization are yet other interpretations that are relevant
here. In this context, Hayek (1945), who argues in favor of decentralization, em-
phasizes that decision making is best left to the institution that can be expected
to make fuller use of the existing knowledge.
According to Jensen and Meckling (1992), there are two ways of collocat-
ing knowledge with decision rights: (a) moving knowledge to the party with the
decision rights and, (b) moving the decision rights to the party that has the
knowledge. The rst option, in the context of Hayeks (1945) work, entails pro-
viding all the required information to a central authority which, in turn, can
be costly. Ultimately, it is the relatively high costs associated with transferring
knowledge to those with decision rights that encourage the lodging of decision
rights with those who have the relevant knowledge (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).
My thesis formalizes allocation of decision rights by the principal where decision
rights are distributed between the principal and the agent based on what the
principal deems t.
While a true market system is associated with alienable private rights, this
is not true for the internal organization of the capitalist rm.2 The internal
organization of the capitalist rm is such that the assignment and enforcement
of decision rights is a matter of organizational policy, with rights seldom be-
ing alienable. As Jensen and Meckling (1992) point out: The assignment of
on and to take an action."
2Alienability is contingent upon (a) having the right to sell or transfer the decision right
and, (b) having the right to capture the proceeds of exchange (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).
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decision-making rights in modern societies is largely a matter of law. But once
assigned, rights are regularly reshu­ ed by contracts, by purchase and sale, and
by managerial assignment within rms. It is this idea where the allocation of
resources may occur independently of the price mechanism that constitutes the
background for the emergence of the rm as analyzed by Coase (1937). That is,
in matters of the rm, it may be optimal for less informed parties (e.g. the CEO,
or the entrepreneur) to hold the decision rights (Coase, 1937; Athey and Roberts
2001; Jensen and Meckling, 1992).
The central trade-o¤ in the allocation of rights is between costs associated
with poor decisions under centralization, and costs associated with inconsistent
objectives under decentralization due to, for instance, separation of ownership and
control. The optimal degree of delegation requires balancing these costs (Dessein,
2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1992). Delegation is a useful instrument for utilizing
the local knowledge of the agent as long as there is not too large an inconsistency
between the objectives of the principal and the agent relative to the principals
uncertainty about the environment (Dessein, 2002). Aghion and Tirole (1997)
argue that delegation is more likely for decisions that are relatively unimportant
to the principal, all other things remaining the same. In the same vein, an increase
in the agents informational advantage increases the attractiveness of delegation
of an investment decision by the principal (Harris and Raviv, 2005).
Of particular relevance here are the results obtained by Grossman and Hart
(1986), and Hart and Moore (1990) in regard to limits to the size of the rm or the
costs and benets of integration. The essence of Grossman and Harts work is that
when there are two parties and an investment decision is particularly important
for party 1 but not for party 2, it is e¢ cient for the rst party to control the asset
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associated with that investment decision. Some of the key results that Hart and
Moore arrive at are that the agent who is indispensable to a coalition of trading
partners should own the asset and that assets that are strictly complementary
should be owned together by the same party.
The interaction between incentive schemes and allocation of decision rights
is examined by Athey and Roberts (2001) and Melkonyan (2007). In particular,
Athey and Roberts argue that it may be optimal to lodge decision rights with
"someone other than the best-informed party" if this facilitates higher overall
value creation within the rm. Melkonyan (2007) demonstrates the optimality
of decentralization under conditions of low cost of agent e¤ort, small informa-
tional asymmetry between principal and the agent, and a signicant impact of
the agents e¤ort on the performance measure. The present thesis also endog-
enizes the input provision decision in the incentive contract, with the principal
deciding the assignment of the decision rights after weighing the benets and costs
associated with providing di¤erent inputs. However, in contrast to the analysis
of Athey and Roberts, this thesis allows for the principal to participate in the
relevant investment decision.
An adverse selection perspective to contracting through PCs is provided by
Goodhue (2000) who examines input control in these contracts and attributes it
to grower heterogeneity, grower risk aversion, and systemic uncertainty. Goodhue
(1999) concludes that regulation of nonlabor inputs of one party by another may
lead to a reduction in production costs and asymmetric information, greater
control over intellectual property rights, and greater consistency in the quality
of nal product. In my analysis, however, I examine input provision in contrast
to input control in Goodhue (1999). Input control as examined by Goodhue
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involves regulation by the integrator of the amount of input to be used by the
grower. Input provision, in contrast, entails the provision and delivery of key
inputs, their purchases (or in-house production), and the design of incentives by
the contracting company to induce and ensure the optimal use of the inputs.
The analysis of input provision in this thesis can be viewed in terms of con-
tract choice between PCs and MCs depending on whether or not there is input
provision. Contractual choice has also been examined by Eswaran and Kotwal
(1985), in the context of xed wage, xed rent, and share contracts as also by
Murrell (1983). Eswaran and Kotwal contend that parties to a contract con-
tribute unmarketed resourcesin the production process (such as the manage-
rial ability of the landlord to make production decisions or the farmers ability
to supervise labor) and it is these resources that determine contractual struc-
ture. Murrell (1983) uses the transactions cost approach to show the relative
transactional e¢ ciency of share contracts as against xed wage or xed rent con-
tracts, as sharing facilitates better coordination and trust building, and reduces
opportunism. Allen and Lueck (2002) also use the transaction costs approach
to examine contract choice between cash rent and cropshare contracts, optimal
input and output sharing rules in sharecropping, asset ownership, and vertical
control. Their analysis, in large part, hinges on whether or not farmers face the
true opportunity costs of the inputs that they use so that an agent will tend to
overuse unpriced attributes of an input or an asset that he does not own (since
his marginal cost is less than the true opportunity cost). Transaction costs also
come in when a marginal cost higher than what it would be in a zero transaction
cost scenario leads to an underprovision of inputs by the agent.
This thesis is an attempt to make operational the inclusion of transaction
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costs in a general theoretical model. To this end, cost minimization by the
agent is modeled so as to include not only the direct costs of purchasing inputs
but also consideration of possible costs that arise in the process of carrying out
transactions relating to the production process. Transaction costs in my analysis
therefore include both neoclassical production costs and costs associated with
negotiating and administering an ongoing production relationship as is also true
in the analysis by Joskow (1985).
In particular, transaction costs include the costs of nding the best buyers or
sellers, costs of drawing contracts and undertaking negotiations, costs of making
arrangements to settle disputes, costs incurred in making inspections, and so
on (Coase, 1991). Another kind of transaction cost imposed by the market,
according to Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1985) is post
market opportunism which, in turn, can be attributed to asset specicities or the
hold-up problem. Asset specicities arise in situations where an installed asset
may become so specialized to suit the requirements of a particular party that
it may have little or no value in an alternative use. As a result, opportunities
may be created for one party to appropriate the specialized quasi rents of the
assets involved at the expense of the other party. Vertical integration, in fact, is
viewed by Klein, Crawford and Alchian, and Williamson as a means of avoiding
opportunistic and ine¢ cient behavior in situations where the impossibility of
writing a completely contingent long term contract obliterates the specication
of a clear-cut distribution of the ex post surplus arising out of highly specialized
assets.
Chapter 3 also explores the possibility of input provision in PCs leading to
what is known as "interlinkage" in the development literature. Interlinkage refers
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to the practice of o¤ering contracts that combine transactions over several dimen-
sions (Basu, Bell and Bose, 2000). Thus, as applied to the case in question, it
refers to the contracting company superseding individual markets and contracting
over several aspects like feed, weight gain, and so on.
There are two instances of interlinkage that have been the focus of attention
in the development literature  (1) linked credit and product markets and (2)
linked credit and labor markets.
In the context of linked credit and product markets, Gangopadhyay and Sen-
gupta (1987) explore a scenario where farmers are assumed to have perfect acces-
sibility to the product market. The credit market, however, is imperfect so that
credit institutions charge the farmer (with little or no collateral) a higher inter-
est rate as opposed to the landlord, thereby leading to a possibility of mutually
advantageous trade. Interlinkage then involves the farmer selling output to and
buying credit from the landlord at prices di¤erent from market prices, despite
having access to the organized (formal) credit or product markets. The optimal
interlinked solution, with the credit market imperfection driving the result, is
characterized by the landlord charging an interest rate lower than what he (and,
therefore, the farmer) faces in the credit market while paying the farmer a price
lower than the market price.
In Basus (1983) analysis of interlinked credit and labor markets, it is the
potential risk in the credit market that constitutes the core of interlinkage.
This potential risk is a critical factor inuencing the structuring of rural markets
whereby landlords lend only to their employees (and employees can borrow only
from their landlords), and o¤er contracts that are interlinked. With all contracts
being equally acceptable or utility equivalent, Basu proposes three scenarios: (a)
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contract interest rate higher than organized sector rate; wage higher than mar-
ginal product, (b) contract interest rate lower than organized sector rate; wage
lower than marginal product, and (c) contract interest rate equal to organized
sector rate; wage equal to marginal product .
Bonded labor as collateral for a loan may be seen as a manifestation of in-
terlinkage between credit and labor markets (Gangopadhyay, 1994). Here the
question of interest is whether the monopoly power of the lender in the credit
market manifests itself in an undervaluation of labor which is o¤ered as collat-
eral. The o¤er of labor as collateral may occur when a farmer cannot get a loan
from the organized credit market on account of not possessing (or possessing
insu¢ cient) marketable collateral.
Another explanation of interlinkage is based on the analysis of Braverman and
Stiglitz (1982) who view the phenomenon as a device for monitoring work e¤ort.
In this context (with a bonded labor clause), the interlinked contract is one that
provides subsidized credit that induces the tenant to borrow more and also work
harder to repay the higher debt so as to avoid being put into bonded labor. Yet
another possibility explored by them entails the landlord requiring that the tenant
borrow only from him and charging an interest rate higher than the market rate.
The idea here is to restrict borrowing, as a high borrowed amount may result in
the tenant being too concerned about defaulting on outstanding loans which, in
turn, may lead him to be too conservative in his choice of techniques.
A special case in this context is the case of no interlinkage with a particular
aspect of production so that incentives with respect to a particular contractible
dimension are absent or low-powered - that is, there is absence of interlinking
with a particular contractible input or output. The aspect of missing incentives
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has been examined in the multitask model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
The authors attribute low-powered or no incentives with respect to a certain
task to the fact that rewarding that task may cause the agent to substitute his
attention away from other tasks. This is especially true for a situation where
errors associated with the measurement of the other tasks are large so that the
other tasks cannot be observed and veried easily. In Chapter 3, however, tech-
nical conditions are derived under which incentives relating to one of two output
dimensions (produced by the agent) tend to zero when both dimensions are ob-
servable and veriable.3 These conditions reect the considerable control that
the principal has over the output dimension for which no or weak incentives are
provided. Even though that output dimension itself is turned out by the agent,
it can be viewed more as a "free" by-product for the agent that is e¤ectively
produced by the principal and results from the principals e¤ort. In this respect,
the result that I obtain in this chapter provides a rationale for low-powered or
missing incentives that has not been captured in the literature on contracts and
organization.
3The two output dimensions are weight gain and leanness both of which are observable and
veriable. Incentives with respect to leanness are absent in PCs as against MCs where quality
based incentives are important.
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2.2 Literature review for "Economic Power and
Endogenous Reservation Utility in Corpo-
rate Dyads" (Chapter 4)
In Chapter 4 titled "Economic Power and Endogenous Reservation Utility in Cor-
porate Dyads", I examine the equilibrium determination of an agents reservation
utility in the context of dyadic relationships involving two rms interacting pair-
wise. The possibility of reservation utility being endogenous is explored formally
by incorporating pre-contract interactions in a contractual framework. In partic-
ular, prior to contracting, the principal and the agent compete as independent
producers with the principal being the larger, more competitive and more cost ef-
fective party. Investment decisions of the principal in this framework, taken once
and for all in the pre-contract phase, favorably impact his variable costs both
as an independent producer and as the principal party to a contract. However,
benets that directly work to the advantage of the principal may also adversely
a¤ect the smaller players expected returns. One option available to the smaller
player, in the face of reduced protability, is to opt for contract production - with
or without input provision - for the larger rm. In this event, however, it is the
(induced) reduced returns of the smaller player that form the benchmark against
which any contract will be designed and constitute an indirect benet for the
principal from his investments. In this chapter, therefore, I formalize both the
direct and the indirect benets of xed investments undertaken by the principal.
The higher these benets, the stronger is the incentive for the principal to decide
in favor of higher initial investment levels in order to realize a more competitive
position vis-à-vis the smaller producer.
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The possibility of reservation utility being endogenous has been explored for-
mally in a seminal paper by Basu (1986), as also in Naqvi and Wemhoner (1995),
and Chambers and Quiggin (2000). All these papers are interesting in that they
attempt to incorporate qualitative issues such as inuence and power that tend
to get marginalized in conventional economic modeling. In particular, it is in the
exploitation of the agent by the principal through extra-contract means in which
endogeneity in reservation utility is manifested.
Basu (1986) analyzes inuence and power in the context of triadic relation-
ships  relationships where two parties interact with each other both directly,
and indirectly, through a third party. This is in contrast to a dyadic relationship
where parties act pairwise. One instance of a triadic relation that Basu analyzes
involves a landlord, a laborer and a merchant. In this setting, a labor contract
o¤ered by the landlord to the laborer is accompanied by a threat whereby, in the
event of this contract not being accepted by the laborer, the landlord ensures that
the merchant will also refuse to trade with him. Basu brings out the exploitative
nature of the exchange by showing that such a transaction that involves a threat
may actually leave the laborer with a negative utility. Naqvi and Wemhoners
contribution is in terms of examining the credibility of threats that underlie the
landlord-tenant-merchant interaction. Hart and Holmstrom (1987) too recognize
that reservation expected utility will be endogenous when ex ante competition is
imperfect so that the parties involved will bargain over the ex ante surplus in the
contract.
A formal analysis of the abovementioned endogeneity property can also be
found in Chambers and Quiggin (2000) where a landlord can a¤ect a peasants
reservation utility through political or other extra-contract exploitative means,
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and the equilibrium reservation utility falls with a reduction in the cost of ex-
ploitation and with an increase in the crop price. Exploitative activities, as ex-
amined by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) are directly unproductive prot-seeking
(DUP) activities that a landlord engages in within the contractual set-up, and
a rise in the cost of such activities raises the peasants equilibrium reservation
utility. Similarly, a rise in the crop price, equated with more favorable market
opportunities that encourage the landlord to increase his exploitative activities,
leads to a reduction in the equilibrium reservation utility. Again, this happens
within the existing contract. In the present framework, however, it is outside-of-
contract interactions that inuence the reservation utility and not extra-contract
means within an existing contractual framework. The pre-contract interactions
that I examine are perfectly legitimate economic activities and need not be of
the nature of DUP activities. The interaction in the model below therefore adds
a di¤erent avor to how reservation utility may become endogenous in economic
interactions.
A key component of this chapter is the investments undertaken by the prin-
cipal in the beginning of the game and it is shown that the higher the benets
associated with the initial investments, the stronger is the incentive for the prin-
cipal to decide in favor of higher levels of such investments so as to realize a more
competitive position with respect to the smaller producers. Investment decisions
taken prior to the production stage have also been examined by La¤ont and
Tirole (2002). While they consider two kinds of investment - contractible and
noncontractible, these investments are undertaken by the agent. For the case of
contractible investments, a cost reimbursement rule is o¤ered by the principal at
the optimum. However, the cost reimbursement rule needs to be suitably adjusted
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towards high powered incentives in the case where investment is noncontractible.
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Chapter 3
Input Provision in Hybrid Contracts - The Case
of Corporate Agriculture
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a state-contingent principal-agent model to analyze the
institution of input provision by a corporate rm that contracts with an agent
for the production of a given commodity. Input provision entails not only
the provision and delivery of key inputs but also their purchases (or in-house
production), as well as contract design to ensure their optimal use.
The provision of key inputs is modeled in the context of American poultry
and pork production contracts such as those o¤ered by Perdue Farms, Smith-
eld Foods, and Tyson Foods. The decision in question is the levels of inputs
(e.g. feed, genetic lines, and medication) that the principal (e.g. a contracting
company) provides to the agent (or the grower). This decision is endogenous to
the model, and facilitates comparison of production contracts (characterized by
input provision) with marketing contracts (characterized by no input provision,
with all inputs purchased and/or provided by the grower himself).
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While production contracts are common in the meat producing industries in
the United States, they are also used for crops like corn and soybean (United
States) and green peas (Denmark). For countries like India, contract farming
through production contracts is a more recent phenomenon primarily applicable
in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, andWest
Bengal. While I use the structure of organization of American meat producing
companies as the point of reference, the results obtained in the thesis can also be
extended to other production contract operations.
The theoretical model formalizes Coases idea that an institutional arrange-
ment emerges if the benets associated with it exceed the costs. Formally, the
case of no input provision is characterized by a corner solution for the optimal
choice of inputs. Moreover, the likelihood of input provision under a produc-
tion contract increases with an increase in the principals market premium per
unit of the quality dimension of output, and with a decrease in the principals
costs of obtaining a particular contractible or noncontractible input, other things
remaining the same. I use a production-theoretic state-contingent approach to
construct the model because it allows for a general production technology, and
the inclusion of transaction costs within the framework of a general theoretical
model.
This chapter also examines the motivation for interlinking contracts in the
context of preferences towards risk and the presence of uncertainty. In this con-
text, one can also examine conditions under which incentives are absent or low-
powered - that is, there is absence of interlinking with a particular contractible
input or output. Technical conditions are derived under which incentives relat-
ing to one of two output dimensions (produced by the agent) tend to zero when
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both dimensions are observable and veriable. These conditions reect the con-
siderable control that the principal has over the output dimension for which no
or weak incentives are provided. Even though that output dimension itself is
turned out by the agent, it can be viewed more as a "free" by-product for the
agent that is e¤ectively produced by the principal and results from the principals
e¤ort. Because the product, for which incentives are low-powered or missing, is
a result of the principals e¤ort, the principal has no reason to provide the agent
any incentives associated with this output dimension.
In the section that follows, I develop the economic model for input provision,
and outline the production technology, pattern of input provision, the preference
and return structures of the principal and the grower, the strategy for modeling
transaction costs, and the timing of the game. Section 3.3 presents the formal
analysis of the two-stage optimization problem including the rationale for input
provision that emerges from the model set-up, and the comparative statics for
the grower. This is followed, in section 3.4, by an analysis of interlinked contracts
along with a discussion on the rationale for the absence of quality based incentives
in PCs. The nal section concludes.
3.2 Model
A multitask principal-agent model is developed in this section for the analysis of
the economics of input provision with the principal and the agent both assumed to
be rational individuals guided by their self-interests. In particular, the principal
is a company or an individual or a cooperative that hires an agent - an individual
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grower, to perform a task(s) through a contract.1 The agent, in my model, has an
informational advantage by virtue of the actions that he takes - that is, there is a
problem of hidden action or moral hazard.2 The agent moves before Nature, and
neither the agents actions nor the state of nature that materializes is observed
by the principal.
Denition 3.1 (adapted from Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995)
The "principal" in a contract is the party that hires another party (the "agent")
to take some action(s) for him.
For the analysis that follows, the terms "principal" and "contracting com-
pany" are used interchangeably, while the term "grower" refers to the agent. The
term "integrator" is specic to a PC, applies to the principal party, and is meant
to reect the furnishing of inputs by the principal - that is, a relatively more
integrated arrangement. The contracting environment is modeled so as to allow
for the analysis of the optimal incentive contract for both PCs (characterized by
input provision by the integrator) and MCs (characterized by independent choice
of inputs by the grower).
3.2.1 The Production Technology
In the production of market hogs and broilers, we have a multi-output stochastic
production technology with the vector of outputs consisting of two components: a
quantity dimension captured by weight gain, y, and a quality dimension measured
1The principal, in the context of the broiler and/or pork industries, is also referred to as a
packer if it processes and packages foods in addition to organizing contract production through
growers.
2There could also be a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party to the contract
(between two parties) lacks full information about what the other party does.
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in terms of lean-fat ratio or lean percentage, q. While leanness is a characteristic
that is considerably controlled for by the integrator under PCs through his choice
of genetics and feed quality, it constitutes a vital output produced by the grower
under MCs. In fact, given the importance of bringing out a consistent product
quality, hog MCs typically specify that lean percentage for the growers animals
will not be less than a certain value which is usually around 50%. The output
vector is represented by z = (y; q).
Suppose there are M xed inputs denoted by the vector h 2 <M+ (e.g. land
area devoted to production). It is assumed that there are N variable inputs
with the variable input vector represented by x 2 <N+ . Components of x include
di¤erent dimensions of human e¤ort, feed quantity, and feed quality. "E¤ort"
(meant to subsume the labor activities of the grower) includes activities such as
supplying feed and making sure that the feed is not stale or infested, maintaining
the right temperature in the barn or the chicken-house and keeping it clean, and
taking care of the animals through immunization and timely medication so as
to minimize animal mortality. The total number of pounds of feed used by the
grower is meant to capture the quantity dimension of feed usage. Feed quality is
indicated by the nutrient content of the feed captured by the content of lysine,
calcium, vitamins and so on. For example, a grower who wants to produce leaner
hogs will need a higher lysine content in the feed till a certain stage of the produc-
tion process. Also included in the category of inputs that represent feed quality
is the use of feed additives which fall in one or more of the following categories:
animal drugs (antibiotics, chemotherapeutics and dewormers), growth promot-
ing minerals, enzymes and organic acids (that serve to improve the digestibility
of the diet), and probiotics which have an e¤ect opposite to that of antibiotics
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and increase the population of desirable microorganisms. Thus, di¤erent nutri-
ents, minerals and chemicals in the feed dene the various input dimensions that
determine feed quality.
The stochastic nature of production is reected by the presence of uncertainty.
Uncertainty entails "Nature", a neutral player, making a choice from among S
mutually exclusive states. Let the set of states of nature be represented by 
 =
f1; 2; :::; Sg. Such a set serves to highlight the uncertain aspects of production
such as those relating to temperature, disease and the biological processes (e.g.
those associated with genetics) in animals. Let 1; 2; :::; S be the probabilities
with which states 1, 2,...,S occur, respectively. Multiple dimensions of the state
of the world may also be considered by taking all possible combinations - that is,
the cartesian product - of the di¤erent characteristics of "Nature".
The sequence of moves that govern production on the "eld" is as follows:
The grower, given h, and prior to the resolution of uncertainty, commits a vector
x of non stochastic variable inputs to production. This, in turn, allows him to
choose ex ante a matrix of state contingent outputs, z 2 <2S+ , realized from the
application of x, with the typical element being zs = (ys; qs), where (ys; qs) rep-
resents the amount of outputs y (weight gain) and q (lean percentage) produced
in state s (s = 1; 2; :::; S). It may be noted that (y; q) is a random variable in
nite 2  S dimensional state space. Nature then makes a draw from 
 which,
along with x, determines a vector of two state contingent outputs, ys and qs,
corresponding to the state s that materializes. That is, (ys; qs) are realizations of
the random variable (y; q). For the complete structure and timing of the game
that incorporates the pattern of input provision, see Section 3.2.6.
I describe the production technology associated with the economic problem in
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terms of an input correspondence or its image, the input set, X(y;q;h) that con-
sists of the sets of variable inputs that can produce a particular state-contingent
output matrix z given a vector of xed inputs (h):
X(y;q;h) = fx 2 <N+ : x 2 <N+ can produce z given hg3 (3.0)
For the ensuing analysis, it is assumed that both the principal and the agent
know the technology and each others preferences.
Note that the process of application of inputs and the realization of outputs
spans two periods. Though the time dimension is suppressed in the analysis, the
input vector x is committed today (time t) and produces two state-contingent
outputs in the next period - weight gain (yt+1) and leanness (qt+1). In the context
of the given problem and the preference structure developed in sections 3.2.3 and
3.2.4, I make the assumption:
Assumption 3.1
Both the principal and the agent have the same subjective discount factor .
This may happen if, for example, both the principal and the agent have access to
the same capital markets, all other things remaining the same.
3The state-contingent outputs are expressed equivalently as the vector (y;q) =








(y1; q1) (y2; q2) : : : (yS ; qS)

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3.2.2 Pattern of Input Provision
The vector of inputs x 2 <N+ , committed prior to the resolution of uncertainty, is
decomposed into two components - the inputs provided by the grower-agent, and
the inputs provided by the integrator-principal. Let xG2 <N+ and xI2 <N+ denote
the input bundles provided by the grower and the integrator, respectively, with
xG + xI = x. Then, the case of a marketing contract is reected by xI = 0 so
that all the relevant inputs are chosen by the grower through xG. On the other
hand, a production contract is characterized by xI  0;xI 6= 0.
The vector of inputs provided by the integrator-principal can be further de-
composed into two components, xc and xNc, where:
xc : represents the vector of inputs that the principal contracts upon with
the agent (e.g. feed quantity), with "contractibility" referring to the input being
observable and veriable, and
xNc : represents the vector of noncontractible inputs provided by the principal
(e.g. feed quality, genetics).
The decomposition here is meant to reect the possibility that certain in-
puts (input attributes, in particular), while provided by the principal, are chosen
through the grower. These are the inputs in xc that the principal contracts upon
with the grower. For instance, in PCs, while the feed is provided by the integra-
tor, the grower is implicitly charged for the number of pounds of feed used when
feed quantity enters the payment scheme in terms of the feed conversion ratio.
However, other inputs such as those corresponding to feed quality, antibiotics,
and the animals are supplied by the principal to the grower but the principal
cannot verify that the grower has actually used them correctly. As a result, he
cannot enforce their proper usage and these inputs are, therefore, not contractible
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and do not gure in the payment scheme.
The principal therefore directly provides and chooses the noncontractibles as
they may be very costly to contract upon and verify with each individual grower.
Integrator companies may also be better equipped to take decisions with respect
to the noncontractible inputs given that they undertake considerable research in
improving the quality of their nal product. Decisions over genetics, for example,
are made by the integrator company through wholly-owned subsidiaries (e.g.
Cobb Vantress, in the case of Tyson Foods division producing chicken) or by
contracting with genetic companies (e.g. Pig Improvement Company, Babcock
Genetics, Inc.). Similarly, the integrator owns feed mills in which raw grain is
mixed with vitamins, minerals and other nutrients. From the point of view of
the grower, a potential moral hazard problem exists even at the integrators end.
However, it is assumed in this model that the grower has full information about
the integrators decisions with respect to the noncontractibles.
Thus, let xI =
264xNc
xc
375 with xNc 2 <J+ and xc 2 <K+ ; J +K = N . In terms of
this decomposition, a PC is characterized as one where xNc  0;xNc 6= 0;xc 
0;xc 6= 0 while an MC is dened as one where xNc = 0 and xc = 0.4 The vital
question here relates to why the principal takes over decisions relating to certain
inputs (more importantly, the noncontractibles) instead of leaving them to be
decided through xG.
4Intermediate combinations such as xNc  0;xNc 6= 0;xc = 0; and xNc = 0;xc  0;xc 6= 0
are also theoretical possibilities that can be considered in the model. Here, the former may be
considered as a variant of a production contract and the latter a variant of a marketing contract.
However, these situations are more hypothetical than real (as far as the sample contracts and
corresponding literature that I have seen are concerned) and are discussed in Section 3.3.4.
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To illustrate the pattern of input provision, the entries corresponding to a
contractible input such as feed quantity, for instance, will gure in (i) xG, repre-
senting the feed quantity provided by the grower himself, and (ii) xc, representing
the number of pounds of the feed provided by the principal. Similarly, the entries
corresponding to a noncontractible input such as concentration of a particular
vitamin in the feed will gure in both xG and xNc depending on which party
provides the input. Moreover, to account for the possibility where di¤erent at-
tributes of an input are chosen by di¤erent parties (for e.g., feed quantity by
the agent and feed quality by the principal), it is assumed that di¤erent input
attributes can be priced separately. Thus, to faciltate analysis, it is assumed that
feed quantity and feed quality (and, if applicable, quantity and quality attributes
of other inputs) can be priced separately. In practice, when the feed conversion
ratio (FCR) enters the payment scheme of the grower in PCs, the feed compo-
nent is described in terms of the quantity of feed used and it is not clear if the
grower implicitly pays a premium on feed quality too (Note that feed quality is
a noncontractible that the principal provides and chooses directly). This aspect
is analyzed as part of the section on Interlinkage.
Note that xI represents the inputs actually provided and delivered (and there-
fore accounted for) by the principal to the growers farm. Whether or not the
grower will actually apply these inputs depends on the incentive structure faced
by the grower to use the inputs that are provided to him - contract terms and
transaction costs for the contractible inputs, and transaction costs for the non-
contractible inputs. That is, it may well be that the grower nds he is better
o¤ augmenting the feed quality, for instance, on his own in which case the feed
quality dimension will have an entry in both xG and xNc. It is incumbent on
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the principal to legally design the contract to get the agent to implement usage
of the corresponding inputs that are provided. This would then feature atleast
two kinds of transaction costs - the transaction costs incurred by the principal in
detecting non-usage of an input, and transaction costs for the agent of facing po-
tential legal action vis-a-vis purchasing the corresponding input from the market.
For a more detailed discussion of transaction costs, see section 3.2.5. Overall, the
vector of inputs x measures the totality of inputs that are (i) provided and deliv-
ered by the principal (and may or may not be applied depending on the incentive
structure) - measured by xI , and (ii) self-provided and actually applied by the
grower (measured by xG ).
3.2.3 Preference and Return Structure of the Principal
From the point of view of the principal, the observables in this problem are the
inputs provided by him (xI) and the ex post output characteristics  weight
gain (y) and lean-fat ratio (q). While xI ; y and q constitute the observables,
the state of nature and the growers decisions with respect to the self provided
inputs cannot be observed. Thus, it is only the grower who can observe the
conditions under which production of y and q takes place once (and if) the inputs
are delivered to him by the principal. Moreover, the principal has no direct
preferences over the growers decision variables in xG.
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral, and maximizes his expected re-
turn. The production structure that he wants to implement is (y;q;xc) - that is,
(ys; qs;x
c) in a particular state s. Let gI(xNc) : <J+ ! < be the e¤ort-evaluation
function for the principal that gives his evaluation over a particular input bundle
xNc2<J+ directly chosen by him. It is assumed that gI(xNc) is nondecreasing,
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continuous, and convex for all xNc (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000).
Properties of the E¤ort Evaluation Function gI(xNc) (based on properties of
the e¤ort evaluation function discussed in Chambers and Quiggin, 2000):
I:1: The e¤ort evaluation function of the principal gI(xNc) is non-decreasing
and smooth for all xNc.
I:2: gI(xNc) is positively linearly homogeneous so that gI(xNc) = gI(xNc)
for all  > 0. This property carries the interpretation that a proportional increase
in xNc along a ray from the origin (or a proportional decrease along the same ray)
leads to an increase (decrease) in the value of g by exactly the same proportion.
I:3: gI(xNc + xNc
0
)  gI(xNc) + gI(xNc0) for all xNc;xNc0 2 <J+. This prop-
erty implies that the principal nds it less costly to concentrate any two input
bundles xNc and xNc
0
in one operation than employ them separately so that the
corresponding e¤ort evaluation is lower in the rst situation than in the second.
From I:2: and I:3, it follows that the e¤ort evaluation function gI(xNc) is
convex in xNc. That is, gI(xNc + (1  )xNc0)  gI(xNc) + (1  )gI(xNc0) for
 2 [0; 1].
Proof of property I:4: (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000)
Following from I:3:, gI(xNc + (1   )xNc0)  gI(xNc) + gI((1   )xNc0)
for bundles xNc 2 <J+ and (1   )xNc
0 2 <J+ and  2 [0; 1]. Using property
I:2: in the right hand side of the inequality gives gI(xNc + (1   )xNc0) 
gI(xNc) + (1  )gI(xNc0).
The return to the principal per pound of weight gain y is normalized to 1,
return per unit lean percentage q is P , and the per unit cost to the principal
associated with the input vector xc is reected by the vector v 2 <K++. Thus, the
principals gross return from y; q; and xI in state s (gross of payments made to
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k   gI(xNc); s = 1; 2; :::; S; k = 1; 2; ::::K.
3.2.4 Preference and Return Structure of the Agent
Denoting the ex post payments made by the principal to the grower by r, the
grower receives a state-contingent amount rs in state s (s = 1; 2; :::; S). That is,
the principal pays the grower rs(ys; qs;xc) in state s if (ys; qs;xc) is realized. Note
that for any two states i and s (i; s 2 S), both ri and rs refer to the same payment
schedule the only di¤erence being that ri is the payment schedule evaluated at
(yi; qi;x
c) and rs is the payment schedule evaluated at (ys; qs;xc). Thus, if zi = zs,
where zi = (yi; qi) and zs = (ys; qs), this implies that ri = rs.
To facilitate analysis in situations where the the model becomes intractable
on account of the general payment structure outlined by r, a linear payment
schedule for the grower will be assumed so that his incentive payment rs in state
s is given by:5





k; s = 1; 2; :::; S; k = 1; 2; ::::K (3.1)
where  is a xed transfer,  is the payment per pound of weight gain,  is the
premium per unit percentage of lean-fat ratio, and k is the contract parameter
associated with the kth contractible input. The xed payment  is a xed sum
paid out periodically during the term of the contract and may, in some contracts,
be specied on a per animal growing facility basis. Note that xc = 0 if the
payment is made for a marketing contract.
5While a linear payment scheme is adopted for the purpose of some analyses, payment
schedules, in practice, tend to be quite complicated as can be seen in specimen contracts that
can be found at www.iowaattorneygeneral.org. However, note that there are situations when
linear contracts are optimal as illustrated in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1994)
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It is assumed that the growers joint evaluation over self provided inputs and
contract payment received in period t + 1 are separable. The joint evaluation is
given by:
W (r)  gG(xG;xI);
where  is the growers subjective discount factor that captures impatience, and
W (r) represents the preference function over r received in period t+ 1. Further,
gG(xG;xI) : <N+ ! < is the e¤ort-evaluation function or the e¤ort-cost function
that gives the growers evaluation over a particular input bundle, xG2 <N+ , given
xI . It is assumed that the grower is a rational cost minimizer and makes his
choices of inputs (either through xG or xc) accordingly.
Properties of the E¤ort Evaluation Function gG(xG;xI):
G:1:gG(xG;xI) is nondecreasing and continuous in xG; and nonincreasing
and continuous in xI . The rst part of G.1. follows from Chambers and Quiggin
(2000) and has the interpretation that it costs more to employ greater amounts
of inputs for production. The second part carries the interpretation that input
provision leads to an overall reduction in the growers own costs. Even though
some cost components will increase (possibly due to the higher scale of produc-
tion), it is reasonable to assume that there is an overall decline in costs associated
with the growers self provided inputs. This is because most of the crucial input
purchases are the responsibility of the integrator under input provision and the
grower need only focus on inputs like labor and utilities. As is evident from data,
the costs of self-provided inputs for a typical hog grower under an MC average $
336,440 with the corresponding average under a PC being $ 27,122.92 (Agricul-
tural Resource Management Survey, 2004). The continuity property allows for
analytical tractability.
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G:2: gG(xG;xI) is convex in both xG and xI (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000).
The rationale for convexity here is the same as that outlined in I:2:; I:3: and
I:4: with the underlying intuition being that averages are preferred to choosing
between two extremes.
The agents preferences over rare based on the expected utility model so
that preferences assume the form (
P
s








where u : < ! < represents the utility function of the agent. The utility function
is strictly increasing and strictly concave so that the agent is strictly risk averse
over state-contingent returns.
I also specically address the case of constant risk averse (CRA) preferences
for the grower where the preference function exhibits both constant absolute and
constant relative risk aversion (Safra and Segal, 1998; Chambers and Quiggin,
2000). In particular, the preferences in this framework are of the form:
W (r) = r   [r]; (3.2)
where r is the mean income equal to E(r) with E(:) representing the expectation
operator, and the expectation being conditional on time-t information. Further,
 is an index of risk aversion and  is the standard deviation associated with r.
Note that:
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The standard deviation associated with r is obtained by taking the positive







i(rs   ri)]2]1=2 (3.3)
For a graphical representation of expected utility preferences and CRA pref-
erences, see Appendix B. Note that CRA preferences are consistent with the
expected utility model only under risk neutrality.
3.2.5 A Note on Transaction Costs
This dissertation is a rst attempt to make operational the inclusion of trans-
action costs in a general state-contingent theoretical model. To this end, cost
minimization by the principal and/or the agent is modeled so as to include not
only the direct costs of purchasing inputs but also consideration of possible costs
that arise in the process of carrying out transactions relating to the production
process. Transaction costs in this thesis therefore include both neoclassical pro-
duction costs and costs associated with negotiating and administering an ongoing
production relationship as is also true for the analysis by Joskow (1985).
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While there is no precise denition of transaction costs in the literature, the
examples cited in the literature are insightful. According to Coase (1991), trans-
action costs include the costs of nding the best buyers or sellers, costs of drawing
contracts and undertaking negotiations, costs of making arrangements to settle
disputes, costs incurred in making inspections, and so on. A specic kind of trans-
action cost imposed by the market, according to Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978) and Williamson (1985) is post market opportunism which, in turn, can be
attributed to asset specicities or the hold-up problem. Asset specicities arise
in situations where an installed asset is so specialized to suit the requirements of
a particular party that it may have little or no value in an alternative use.
An illustration of the asset specicity problem can be found in Martinez and
Zering (2004) who look at genetics as a specic asset in relation to marketing
contracts. Thus, given that di¤erent packers have di¤erent genetic requirements,
a particular type of genetics relied upon by a hog producer for a given packer may
have signicantly less value for other packers. As a result, the packer with whom
the grower contracts will have an incentive to appropriate the specialized quasi-
rent (in the sense of Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978) of the asset concerned
and as long as the price o¤ered exceeds that from the next best alternative, the
grower may have few options outside of selling hogs to this packer.
The housing facility that needs to be constructed as per the integrators spec-
ications in a PC is another example of a specic asset. For instance, the Chris-
tensen Farms (CF) contract has the following precondition: "the selection of
contractors (by the grower) and all Facility site plans and specications shall be
subject to CFs advance approval." Further, it is often the case that the integrator
collaborates with a particular building company to get the building constructed
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for the grower who enters into the contract, as per its requirements. For example,
Swinton and Martin (1997) in their case study of hog contracts mention how Pork
Partners had an agreement with Hog Slat, Inc., to construct a specic, highly
automated nishing barn. Given the highly specic nature of the asset involved,
a competitive outcome results only as long as the integrator can commit himself
to compensating the grower for the entire useful life of the facility. If this is
not the case, then the company comes to enjoy monopsony power at the time of
contract renewal (Inoue and Vukina, 2005).
The approach in my analysis is such that any cost minimization exercise in-
volves incorporation of transaction costs in addition to considering the direct
costs of purchasing inputs. In particular, it is assumed that the e¤ort evalulation
functions for the principal (gI(xNc)) and the grower (gG(xG;xI)) , respectively,
are such that they are convex on <J+ and <N+ , respectively. Thus, the functions
are such that the evaluation over each input can vary linearly or nonlinearly with
the amount of the input used. The linear formulation allows the agent to pur-
chase inputs that are in perfectly elastic supply. Chambers and Quiggin (2000)
argue that the nonlinear generalization can prove relevant in analyzing situations
where some inputs are not purchased in the market, as is the case for allocation
of family labor or the percentage of personal time devoted to production. In
this context, one can exploit the general, convex formulation of the e¤ort evalu-
ation function further and incorporate consideration of transaction costs in the
input evaluation functions. Even though the world of transaction costs may be
"complex" and di¢ cult to identify for the outsider, such costs are, nevertheless,
taken into account by the decision maker who is assumed to be a rational cost
minimizer.
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To illustrate, suppose there is only one input x priced at w per unit, then an
e¤ort evaluation function (illustrated independently of the principal or the agent)
that is linear is given by g(x) = wx. However, it may be the case that inspection
costs - a category of transaction costs described above, increase as one increases
the scale on which inputs are purchased. A simple formulation like wx will not
capture this e¤ect except linearly where one assumes that w carries some element
of inspection cost per unit. To capture the e¤ect of cost of inspections in a more
general sense, one can specify an e¤ort evaluation function (while dispensing with
the positive linear homogeneity property as outlined in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4)
such as g(x) = wx+ (x  k)2 where k is any constant.
One can also take into account the possibility of a conict leading to judicial
costs in the state-contingent framework. In this case, one can specify a non-
linear function to reect judicial expenditures relating to purchases of input x.
However, there is one additional dimension that one must keep in mind while
factoring a transaction cost of this kind. One will now have to modify the state-
contingent commodities to reect uncertainty associated with the emergence of
a conict. This can be done if "Nature" has a dimension in addition to that
described in the production technology where uncertain aspects of production
include not only temperature, disease and the biological or metabolic processes
in animals (as outlined in the production technology) but also the possibility of
a conict.
3.2.6 Game Structure and Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
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Figure 3.1: Timing of the Game
leave-it contract that species the state-contingent payments and the principals
decision (implemented once the contract is accepted) with respect to the non-
contractible inputs xNc. It is assumed in this model that the grower has full
information about the principals decision of xNc and that there is no hidden
action problem with respect to xNc. Contracts, in practice, do not clearly specify
what the exact choices of the noncontractible inputs will be. However, such infor-
mation may be gleaned through repeated contracting or from other growers who
have earlier contracted with the same company or, as revealed by some broiler
growers, from the company itself. In any case, this is information in a broad sense
- it is possible for the grower to obtain information about the animal breed but
not each and every detail relating to the genetic composition, or its possible to
know the di¤erent grades of feed but not details about each and every nutrient.
For instance, most growers of the Eastern Shore with whom Ive interacted had
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a good idea about the kind of bird they were growing. The birds delivered to the
growersfarms were selected at random from di¤erent genetic pools and carried
di¤erent ock numbers. Essentially, there were about 5 breeds that the growers
are concerned with depending on the company with which they had a contract -
Arbor Acres, Case, Cobb, Cornish and Ross. Similarly, they are also able to infer
feed quality from the feed that is delivered. Feed that is of poor quality tends to
have too much dust or may be too ne like our. Good feed is palletized feed.
Further, when the feed is sent to the grower, he gets a feed ticket that species
the feed composition.
Based on the o¤ered state-contingent payments and the principals choice of
the noncontractibles, the grower accepts or rejects the contract. If the grower
accepts the o¤er, the principal delivers the contractible and the noncontractible
inputs.6 Once the inputs are delivered by the principal, the grower commits the
input vector x = xG + xI to produce (y;q). At time t + 1, Nature makes a
draw from among the S states that, along with x, determines a vector of state-
contingent outputs, (ys; qs) corresponding to the state s that Nature chooses. The
principal is the residual claimant or the legal owner of the product produced by
the agent.
6The inputs are actually delivered after a lag of a few months during which actual arrange-
ments are made for input provision. For the purpose of modeling, this act is clubbed with other
activities in time period t. It is also assumed that choices of noncontractible inputs are made
as per the decisions made in the beginning of the game, and that the lag of a few months does
not a¤ect the commitments made in the beginning.
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3.3 Analysis
The model is solved as a two-stage game where the principal rst chooses xNc
and the state-contingent payments r = (r1; r2; :::rS). Then, given r;xNc, the
grower chooses inputs xG and xc, and the state contingent output vectors (ys; qs);
s = 1; 2; ::::; S. In both stages, the optimal choices are made so as to maximize
the payo¤s of the party concerned. I solve backwards to characterize equilibrium
behavior. Thus, I rst examine the optimal decisions of the agent given xNc and
the specied payment structure. Then, having obtained the optimal xG and xc
and the optimal state-contingent output vectors from the growers optimization
problem, I examine the principals optimal choice of xNc and r, with the principal
maximizing his expected payo¤ subject to the agent receiving no less than his
reservation utility u.

















c))g   gG(xG;xI)  u (IR)




c))g   gG(xG;xI) (IC)
: x 2 X(y;q;h)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
[A]
where (IR) is the individual rationality constraint or the participation con-
straint that guarantees a minimum expected payo¤ u to the agent. The con-
straints represented by (IC) are the incentive compatibility constraints that make
it rational for the agent to privately choose the state-contingent output vector
and vector of contractible inputs as desired by the principal.
Let C(xI ;y;q;h) represent the growers variable cost function that reects the
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(ex ante) minimum cost of producing a given state contingent y;q 2 <S+ given h
and xI . It reects the growers cost minimizing choices of xG, and is dened as:
C(xI ;y;q;h) = min
xG
fgG(xG;xI) : x 2 X(y;q;h)g;
if there is an input vector x 2<N+ that can produce a given y and q and 1
otherwise. It is assumed that the production technology is such that it guar-
antees the existence of a cost function that is twice continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly convex in state-contingent outputs (Chambers,
2002). Convexity of the cost function in state-contingent outputs is based on the
property of the input set where if both x and x0 can produce z, then any convex
combination of x and x0 must also be able to produce z (Chambers and Quiggin,
2000). Moreover, the cost function is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in
xI .
By the principle of conditional optimization, I take xI ;y;q; r as given so that
all terms in problem [A] except gG(xG;xI) are xed. Conditional on a given
xI ;y;q; r, I can rst simplify [A] by minimizing gG(xG;xI) subject to the con-
straint that x 2 X(y;q;h) which, in turn yields the cost function C(xI ;y;q;h)
dened above. I then allow xI ;y;q; r to vary and use the cost function for the






















c))g   C(xI ;y;q;h) (IC)
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The optimal contracts that are dicussed in the literature are typically those
that have payments monotonically increasing in the observed output. This result
is derived in Chambers and Quiggin (2000) and follows from the assumption that
C(xI ;y;q;h) is strictly increasing in state-contingent outputs (See Appendix B).
Now, in the case of pork, there exists, in general, a direct relationship between
payments and lean percentage. However, lean premiums are lower for hogs that
exceed 58.9% lean percent for the weight categories 197-216 lbs and 232-292 lbs
(Martinez and Zering, 2004). This may be attributed to the fact that excessive
leanness is not a favorable trait when considering pork quality. While the prop-
erty of free disposability of output would allow the grower to do away with any
excessive output, it no longer applies here as the lean percentage, once realized,
cannot be altered.
Proposition 3.1
Payments monotonically increase in state-contingent outputs under the as-
sumption that the e¤ort-cost function strictly increases in state-contingent out-
puts. However, if the e¤ort-cost function decreases in state-contingent outputs for
some range of production and there is no free disposability of output, payments in
that range will be nonmonotonic - that is, the optimal payment structure will be
such that the payment will decrease with an increase in state-contingent output.
See Appendix C for proof.
3.3.1 Agents Maximization Problem








c))g   C(xI ;y;q;h)
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The growers optimal choices are characterized by the following rst order
conditions (Note that the rst subscript of r refers to the state of nature and
the second subscript the argument with respect to which the second-order par-
tial derivative is being taken. For example, the second subscripts 1; 2; k refer to
partial derivatives taken with respect to weight gain, leanness, and the kth con-
tractible input, respectively. The subscript of the cost function C(:) represents
the argument itself with respect to which the partial derivative is being taken):
yl : [lu
0(rl)rl1(yl; ql;x












I ;y;q;h)  0; xck  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K
(3.6)
in the notation of complementary slackness.
The solution to the growers optimization problem is obtained by solving
simultaneously the system of equalities and/or inequalilties described by (3.4),
(3.5), and (3.6). The optimal solution can be expressed in terms of best response
functions of the general form: ys = ys(r;xNc;h; ), qs = qs(r;xNc;h; ), xc =
xc(r;xNc;h; ); s = 1; 2; :::; S. These expressions are functions of the parameters
that the grower treats as given - that is, r;xNc;h; and .







; l 2 
 (3.7)
The left hand side of (3.7) represents the agents marginal rate of transforma-
tion (MRT) between yl and ql which, in turn, reects the rate at which the agent
is willing to substitute ql for yl - that is, willingness to substitute state-contingent
goods within a particular state. The right hand side of (3.7) is representative of
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the rate at which the contract allows him to substitute ql for yl. In equilib-
rium, the agent equates his MRT to the rate of transformation as dictated in the
contract.
Proposition 3.2
Within a particular state, the optimal levels of outputs yl and ql; l 2 S; are
such that the agent equates their marginal rate of transformation to the ratio of
the partial derivatives of the contract payment schedule with respect to yl and ql;
l 2 S, respectively.






; l 2 

That is, in equlibrium, with a linear payment schedule, the agent equates the
state-contingent marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between yl and ql (or
outputs within a state) to the ratio of the contract parameters associated with
yl and ql. Thus, within a particular state, the optimal levels of outputs yl and
ql are such that their rate of transformation is given by the ratio of the contract
parameters. In particular, note that the marginal rate of transformation is exactly
what would be obtained if the grower were risk neutral (or, for that matter, risk
loving) and faced a linear payment schedule. The intuition here is that risk
attitudes should not matter at the margin (for the characterization of behavior
at the optimum within a state) as there is e¤ectively no uncertainty within a
state, and hence, a risk neutral agent and a risk averse agent can be expected to
have a similar decision rule. A similar within-state reasoning can be applied to
the state-contingent outputs corresponding to the other states.
Corollary 3.1
For a linear payment schedule, irrespective of preferences towards risk, the
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optimal levels of outputs yl and ql; l 2 S; within a particular state are such that
their rate of transformation is given by the ratio of the contract parameters.
Assuming interior solutions, and adding the left hand side terms of rst order
conditions corresponding to ys; s 6= l to both sides of the rst order condition for






















The left hand side of (3.8) is the discounted, expected benet of bringing about
a nonstochastic increase in y or producing an extra unit of all state-contingent
y0s. This interpretation can be understood as follows: Given the agents utility
function, and the probabilities 1; 2; :::S with which states 1; 2; :::; S occur,
respectively, the discounted expected marginal benet of producing an extra unit














) which is the
same as the left hand side of (3.8). The corresponding cost at the margin




I ;y;q;h), the right
hand side of (3.8). At the optimum, the agent equates his marginal benet to
the marginal cost in the direction of a nonstochastic increase in quantity. The
optimal solution characterized by (3.9) can be interpreted in the same way as
(3.8) except that it is with reference to quality.
Proposition 3.3
The agent, at the optimum, equates his discounted expected marginal benet to
the discounted expected marginal cost in the direction of a nonstochastic increase
in quantity (quality).
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3.3.2 Comparative Statics for the Agent (Linear Payment
Schedule)
To examine the comparative statics for the agent, I use the linear payment scheme






k; s = 1; 2; :::; S; k = 1; 2; ::::K. The comparative statics for the
agents choice variables are worked out with respect to the contract parameters
; ; and  using Topkiss Monotonicity Theorem. This theorem constitutes a
methodology for conducting comparative statics with the attractive feature that it
dispenses with superuous assumptions required in the classical method that uses
the Implicit Function Theorem (Amir, 2005). As Amir (2005) points out: "The
main insight is indeed quite simple. If, in a maximization problem, the objective
reects a complementarity between an endogenous variable and an exogenous
parameter, in the sense that having more of one increases the marginal return to
having more of the other, then the optimal value of the former will be increasing
in the latter".
Let the parameter vector and the vector of choice variables be represented by
 = (; ; ; ) and a = (y;q;xc), respectively. The set of values that  can take
are given by the parameter space ; such that  2  and  2 <4. Similarly, the
action space is dened asA  <2S+K where a 2 A. Let  = (; ; ; ) = (1; ::4)
and a = (y;q;xc) = (a1; a2; :::a2S+K).
With the linear payment schedule, the agents maximization problem can now
be written as follows:
max
y;q;xc










k)g   C(xI ;y;q;h)
The corresponding rst order conditions are:
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yl : lu
0(rl)  Cyl(xI ;y;q;h)  0; yl  0; l 2 
 (3.10)
ql : lu







I ;y;q;h)  0; xck  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K (3.12)
in the notation of complementary slackness.
Suppose B() represents the optimal action correspondence with a() 2
argmaxF (a;;h) s.t. a 2B(). Inherent in the Topkis Monotonicity Theorem
(formally stated below) is an order structure relating to the parameter space 
and action space A that warrants some explanation. In particular, the function
F (a;;h) exhibits increasing di¤erences in (a;) if a  a0 and   0 implies:7
F (a;;h)  F (a0;;h)  F (a;0;h)  F (a0;0;h)
for all pairs (a;;h) and (a0;0;h) in A  . The function F (a;;h) is said to
be supermodular in a for each xed  and h if for any a and a0 in A, and any
xed , we have:
F (a;;h) + F (a0;;h)  F (a _ a0;;h) + F (a ^ a0;;h);
where a_a0 denes the "meet" of a and a0 given by the coordinate-wise maximum
of a and a0, and a^a0 denes the "join" of a and a0 given by the coordinate-wise
minimum of a and a0. That is, a_a0 = (max[a1; a01];max[a1; a01]; :::;max[a2S+K ; a02S+K ];
and a ^ a0 = (min[a1; a01];min[a1; a01]; :::;min[a2S+K ; a02S+K ]. A set is said to be a
lattice if the "meet" and the "join" of any two of its elements are also contained
7Given any two vectors a and a0, a 2 A, a  a0 if ai  a0i, i = 1; 2; :::2S +K. Similarly, for
the vectors  and 0,   0 if i  0i; i = 1; 2; 3; 4.
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in the set. A subset of a lattice is called a sublattice and also satises the prop-
erty of a lattice in that it contains the meet and join of each pair of its elements.
Overall, if a function F (a;;h) is supermodular in (a;) given h then:
1) F (a;;h) is supermodular in a for each xed  and h, and
2) F (a;;h) exhibits increasing di¤erences in (a;). (Sundaram, 1999)
Theorem 3.1
[Topkiss Monotonicity Theorem] Let A  <2S+K be a compact lattice,   <4
be a lattice, and F (a;;h) be a continuous function on A for each . Suppose
F (a;;h) has increasing di¤erences in (a;) and is supermodular in a for each
xed . In addition, suppose that B() is a compact, ascending correspondence.
Then, a() = argmaxF (a;;h) s.t. a 2B()
(i) is a nonempty compact sublattice that admits maximal(mx) and mini-
mal(ml) selections8:
amx() = supfa 2 a()g and aml() = inffa 2 a()g
(ii) is an ascending correspondence, and
(iii) amx() and aml() are nondecreasing functions. (Sundaram, 1999)
In particular, if F (a;;h) is smooth (twice continuously di¤erentiable), the
properties of increasing di¤erences in (a;) and supermodularity in a for each
xed  are, respectively, equivalent to:
@2F (a;;h)
@ai@j




 0; ai 6= aj; ai; aj 2 a (3.14)
8If a() is a subset of A for each  in , and a() is in a() for each  in , then the
function a() from  into A is a selection from a() (Topkis, 1998).
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To accommodate those cases where, in the agents maximization problem,
@2F (a;;h)
@ai@j
 0; ai 2 a; j 2 ; and @
2F (a;;h)
@ai@aj
 0; ai 6= aj; ai; aj 2 a, I con-
sider the corresponding decision in ai as being ( ai) so that @
2F (a;;h)
@( ai)@j  0 and
@2F (a;;h)
@( ai)@aj  0. This order-reversing strategy also allows me to take into consider-
ation complementarities and substitutabilities between di¤erent choice variables.
Therefore, to illustrate the comparative statics, I rst partition the choice set a =






K) as ( ypI ; qpI ; xc;pI
...ypII ;qpII ;xc;pII) or
( apI ...apII) where the two partitions pI and pII are mutually exclusive. Here,
SpI = f1; 2; :::; spIg state-contingent outputs andKpI = f1; 2; :::; kpIg contractible
inputs are placed in  apI , and SpII = f1; 2; :::; spIIg state-contingent outputs and
KpII = f1; 2; :::; kpIIg contractible inputs are placed in apII , with the distribution
being such that spI + spII = 2S and kpI + kpII = K. The partition ( apI ...apII)
denes two groupings of choice vectors,  apI and apII , and the division is such
that two state-contingent outputs or inputs within any one grouping dened by
the partition are technical complements and two outputs or inputs from di¤erent
groupings are technical substitutes. Formally, the following assumptions apply to
the comparative statics exercise:
Assumption 3.2





into two as ( ypI ; qpI ; xc;pI ...ypII ;qpII ;xc;pII) or ( apI ...apII), with SpI = f1; 2; :::; spIg
state-contingent outputs and KpI = f1; 2; :::; kpIg contractible inputs placed in
 apI , and SpII = f1; 2; :::; spIIg state-contingent outputs andKpII = f1; 2; :::; kpIIg
contractible inputs placed in apII . The distribution is such that spI + spII = 2S
and kpI + kpII = K.
(ii) The choice variables ai and aj are technical complements if (a) i; j 2 SpI
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or KpI , i 6= j or (b) i; j 2 SpII or KpII , i 6= j. In contrast, ai and aj are technical
substitutes if (a) i 2 SpI or KpI , and j 2 SpII or KpII or (b) j 2 SpI or KpI , and
i 2 SpII or KpII .
(iii) There are no sign reversals - that is, a change in the manner in which a
given partition is dened, when levels of outputs and/or inputs change.
In the literature (see Holmstrom (1991) for example), if two state-contingent
outputs are technical complements, increasing one state-contingent output will
decrease the marginal cost of producing the other state-contingent output so that




 0 (ai; aj 2 a; ai 6= aj). The opposite holds true for technical
substitutes, that is, @
2C(a;h)
@ai@aj
 0 (ai; aj 2 a; ai 6= aj). If all the cross partial
derivatives of the cost function are zero, the tasks are technically independent.
Note that the notion of technical dependence (or independence) described here is
not strictly the same as what is found in the literature (see Holmstrom and Mil-
grom (1991)). The concept here refers to technical dependence or independence
given the inputs xNc chosen by the principal and complementarity entails taking
derivatives of the objective function F (:) and not just the cost function C(:).
Appendix D lists the set of su¢ cient conditions (derived from rst order
conditions (3.10) through (3.12)) for the monotone comparative statics with re-
spect to [( yI; qI; xc;I...yII); ] - a modied version of the partition
dened in Assumption 3.2.9 Here, ( yI; qI; xc;I...yII) represents a par-
tition in which (i) weight gain corresponding to SI = f1; 2; :::; sIg states is
9The notation I and II is used to illustrate the monotone comparative statics with respect
to . Similarly, the modied partitions for the comparative statics with respect to  and k
are represented by I and II, and I and II, respectively.
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placed in  yI and weight gain corresponding to SII = f1; 2; :::; sIIg states
is placed in yII, with sI + sII = S, (ii) quality corresponding to all states
is placed in  qI (qpII in the original partition is a null vector), and (iii)
xc;pII in the original partition is a null vector and all contractibles are placed
in the rst partition in the vector  xc;I. The comparative statics were taken for




 0; b 2 SpII and @
2F (a;;h)
@(xc;pIIk )@
 0; k 2 KpII so that the inequality
(3.13) is not satised.
The corresponding su¢ cient conditions for ( yI; qI; xc;I...yII) to
be increasing in  are derived in Appendix D, and show that an increase in 
leads to an increase in weight gain in the states that correspond to yII. These
changes resulting from an increase in  are also accompanied by a decrease in (i)
weight gain in the states corresponding to  yI, (ii) quality in all states, and
(ii) all the contractible inputs.
Similarly, on account of @
2F (a;;h)
@(ypIIb )@
 0; b 2 SpII and @
2F (a;;h)
@(xc;pIIk )@
 0; k 2 KpII ,
su¢ cient conditions were derived for the optimal decision vector ( yI; qI; xc;I...qII)
to be increasing in . The vector ( yI; qI; xc;I...qII) is such that (i)
weight gain corresponding to all states is placed in  yI (ypII in the original
partition is a null vector), (ii) quality corresponding to SI = f1; 2; :::; sIg states
is placed in  qI and quality corresponding to SII = f1; 2; :::; sIIg states is
placed in qII, with sI + sII = S, and (iii) all contractibles are placed in the




 0; b 2 SpII and @
2F (a;;h)
@(qpIIb )@k
 0; b 2 SpII , su¢ cient condi-
tions were only derived for the optimal decision vector ( yI; qI; xc;I...xc;II)
to be increasing in k. The partition is such that (i) weight gain corresponding to
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all states is placed in  yI (ypII in the original partition is a null vector), (ii)
quality corresponding to all states is placed in  qI (qpII in the original parti-
tion is a null vector), and (iii) KI = f1; 2; :::kIg contractible inputs are placed
in the rst partition and KII = f1; 2; :::kIIg in the second with kI +kII = K.
The corresponding su¢ cient conditions are listed in Appendix D.
Proposition 3.4
Let A  <2S+K be a compact lattice,   <4 be a lattice, and F (a;;h)
be a continuous function on A for each . Then, under conditions of technical
complementarity and increasing di¤erences in (a;), (i) the optimal choice vector
( yI; qI; xc;I...yII) increases in , (ii) the vector ( yI; qI; xc;I...qII)
increases in , and (iii) the vector ( yI; qI; xc;I...xc;II) increases in k.
3.3.3 Principals Maximization Problem

















c))g   C(xI ;y;q;h)  u (IR)
and incentive constraints (3.4) through (3.6).
To examine this problem further, I assume a linear payment structure for
the agent as given by (3.1), with the agent having CRA preferences over r as
outlined in (3.2). The model is the same as that examined in [A] except that
with a linear incentive payment, the principal now rst chooses xNc and the
contract parameters ; ; ; (instead of aggregated state-specic payments);
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and then, given ; ; ;;xNc, the grower chooses inputs xG and xc, and the
state contingent output vectors (ys; qs); s = 1; 2; ::::; S. I solve backwards to
characterize equilibrium behavior.
The agent, in particular, chooses optimal xG and xc and state-contingent y
and q given ; ; ;;xNc to maximize:
max
y;q;xc





k   C(xI ;y;q;h)g; k = 1; 2; ::::K
where T = 2[r] - that is, T represents the variance associated with r. For a





k, (3.3) simplies to give:
















k; k = 1; 2; ::::K
The agents optimal choices are characterized by the following rst order con-










i(rl ri)]g] Cql(xI ;y;q;h)  0; ql  0; i; l; s 2 

(3.16)
xck : k   Cxck(x
I ;y;q;h)  0; xck  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K (3.17)
in the notation of complementary slackness. For the rst order conditions (for
both the principal and the agent) that correspond to a more general payment
structure such as rs =  + ps, where  is a xed transfer and ps(ys;qs;xc) is a
state-contingent incentive payment, see Appendix F.
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The solution to the agents optimization problem is obtained by solving si-
multaneously the system of equalities and/or inequalities described by (3.15),
(3.16), and (3.17). The solution to (3.15) - (3.17) can be expressed in terms of
the parameters that the grower treats as given and is of the general form: ys =
ys(; ;;x
Nc;h; ), qs = qs(; ;;xNc;h; ), xc = xc(; ;;xNc;h; ); s =
1; 2; :::; S.
The principals maximization problem with a linear payment schedule and
CRA preferences for the agent can now be rewritten as:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
;;;;y;q;xI

















k   C(xI ;y;q;h)  u (IR)
and incentive constraints (3:15) through (3:17):
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
[B]
The solution to this problem is such that the agents individual rationality
(IR) constraint holds with an equality. If this were not the case, then the principal
could reduce  (or, in general, reduce payment rs in all states s; s = 1; 2; :::S,
by the same amount) until the constraint were to bind, without a¤ecting the
incentive constraints (3.15) through (3.17) which are independent of : Since this
would lead to an outcome that would be strictly preferred by the principal, the
solution to the problem is characterized by a binding participation constraint.
Proposition 3.5
The agents participation constraint or the individual rationality constraint
holds with an equality in the solution to the principal-agent problem described by
[A] or [B].





k in the IR
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constraint plays the role of a transfer from/ to the principal to/ from the agent
so that one can substitute for this term from this constraint into the principals


















k   T 1=2   C(xI ;y;q;h)  gI(xNc)  u
Using the expression above as the principals objective function, and using the
solution from the incentive constraints (3.15)-(3.17), ys = ys(; ;;xNc;h; );
qs = qs(; ;;x
Nc;h; ); xc = xc(; ;;xNc;h; ); s = 1; 2; :::; S, the maxi-


















if(ys(	)  yi(	)) + (qs(	)  qi(	))g]2]1=2  
  C(xNc;xc(	);y(	);q(	);h)  gI(xNc)  ug (3.18)
The corresponding rst order conditions are given by (The subscript for "C"
reects the argument with respect to which the partial derivative of the agents
e¤ort cost function is taken. The arguments (xNc;xc(	);y(	);q(	);h) of the






































































































xNcj  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K; j = 1; 2; ::::J (3.22)
The subsections and/or sections that follow formally examine the rst order
conditions (3.19) - (3.22).
3.3.4 Input Provision in Production Contracts
The rationale for input provision can be understood in terms of conditions that
determine when a marketing contract involving no input provision occurs (equiv-
alent to the case where a PC that allows for input provision does not occur). In
particular, an MC is associated with xNc = 0;xc = 0, that is, corner solutions
where the rst order conditions in (3.17) (from the agents maximization prob-
lem) and (3.22) (from the principals maximization problem) are represented by
the following system of inequalities:
k   Cxck(x
I ;y;q;h)  0; xck = 0; k = 1; 2; ::::K (3.23)
























xNcj = 0; k = 1; 2; ::::K; j = 1; 2; ::::J (3.24)
for the jth noncontractible input provided by the principal.
The rst order condition in (3.24) can be separated into two parts: (a) the
marginal benet, net of contractual payments, associated with the provision of














g, and (b) the marginal




an indirect cost component ("indirect" as it originates from the agents side)
given by CxNcj (x
I ;y;q;h). Note that the change in the agents minimum costs,
reected in CxNcj (x
I ;y;q;h), is internalized by the principal in making his optimal
decision as regards input provision. Moreover, the expression CxNcj (x
I ;y;q;h)
will reect a benet if its value is negative. This is, indeed, the case for PCs
where the growers costs fall substantially on account of inputs being provided
by the integrator. The inequality in (3.24) therefore implies that as long as the
net benet at the margin associated with a particular noncontractible input is
non-positive (when the maxima is at the boundary), there will be no incentive for
the principal to provide inputs in xNc. Similarly, at xck = 0, following from (3.23),
if the discounted contract price k associated with a contractible input xck is less
than than the growers marginal cost of using that input, there is no incentive
for the grower to use the kth contractible input provided by the integrator. All
relevant costs and benets are weighed when taking into account whether or not
a particular decision must be implemented. In other words, it is the relatively
high marginal costs (or the relatively low marginal benets) at the boundary that
drive the result.
Now, note that the solution represented by (3.23) for the contractibles is
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already reected in (3.24) for the noncontractibles following from the second
stage of optimization. As a result, a MC can be dened in terms of the rst order
conditions given by (3.24) for the noncontractibles while also having xc = 0.































xNcj = 0; x
c = 0 (3.25)
The inequality in (3.25) can be viewed as an alternative corner optimum rep-
resentation of a marketing contract. Note that it is equilibrium behavior that
is being examined here, and that the rst order conditions in (3.24) are neces-
sary but not su¢ cient to identify a maxima. Further, the left hand side of the
inequality (3.25) is the directional derivative of the principals objective function
(3.18) in the direction (r;xNc) = (0;1). The expression can be interpreted as
the amount by which the principals net payo¤ changes when the principal in-
creases all noncontractible inputs from 0 by a marginal amount at the same rate.
Overall, the principal, in his decisionmaking, weighs his discounted, marginal
benets net of contractual payments, as reected by 
P
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. A production contract is optimal if, at the boundary,
where no inputs are provided, the marginal benet of input provision exceeds the
marginal cost. This is then the formalization of a principle standard to economic
decision making by a contracting company that needs to examine the protability
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of input provision in equilibrium.
If the principal does decide to opt for input provision based on a production
contract, then the exact nature of provision will be determined by the optimal
values of xNc and xc that result from an interior solution such that xNc  0;xc 
0;xNc 6= 0;xc 6= 0. This then reects the extent of input provision giving a formal
mathematical expression to "limits to rm size" as described by Coase.
A PC therefore corresponds to xNc  0;xc  0;xNc 6= 0;xc 6= 0. The
nature of the solution will di¤er depending on how many contractible and/or
noncontractible inputs are provided by the principal. Once the principal decides
to provide a particular contractible or a noncontractible input under contract,
this decision has two e¤ects:
a) Providing more inputs reduces the extent of the hidden action problem
and, therefore, the number of unobservable inputs for the principal in the event
that he left these decisions to be taken by the grower through xG. This, in turn,
gives the principal more control over the production process.
b) As far as the contractibles are concerned, the principals decision to provide
a particular level of a contractible input has to be implemented through the agent.
Therefore, the power of the incentives will have an important role to play here.
In general, when more inputs (contractible or noncontractible) are provided
by the principal, one can expect the optimal incentive contract to provide more
intensive or high-powered incentives for the agent with respect to the contractibles
so that he uses inputs (or produces state-contingent outputs) as desired by the
principal. The corresponding incentives with respect to the state-contingent out-
puts can also be expected to become more high-powered so as to realize a more
desirable outcome. All this may be achieved through higher s, for instance, or
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through a higher  or .
Apart from the interior solution discussed above, there also exist theoretical
possibilities where interior solutions may exist only for one of the categories of
inputs - either the contractible or the noncontractible category of inputs. That
is, intermediate combinations such as xNc  0;xc = 0;xNc 6= 0 and xNc =
0;xc  0;xc 6= 0 are also theoretical possibilities that can be considered in the
model. Here, the former may be considered as a variant of a production contract
whereby it is plausible that the quantity dimension of feed (which is contractible),
for example, is bought by the agent from the open market while the feed quality (a
noncontractible) of the feed "purchased" is decided by the principal. The second
possibility where xNc = 0;xc  0;xc 6= 0 can be seen as a variant of a marketing
contract reecting a situation where, for example, the quality of the feed (now
obtained from the principal) is something that the agent chooses. However, in
practice, as far as the sample contracts and corresponding literature that I have
seen are concerned, these intermediate combinations constitute possibilities that
are more hypothetical than real.
Denition 3.2
A marketing contract that involves no input provision by the principal is a
corner solution for the optimal choice of all inputs in xI .
Based on denition 3.2, one can conclude that there is incentive for the prin-
cipal to provide inputs under a production contract if, at the boundary, where
no inputs are provided, the benet at the margin associated with input provision
exceeds the corresponding costs.
Further, the higher the relative market premium Passociated with quality,
other things remaining the same, the higher is the net marginal benet (NMB) of
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in (3.25) that takes into account all the rst order conditions. A higher NMB,
in turn, raises the likelihood that input provision will take place through a PC.
The concept of "likelihood" can be understood as follows (the intuition provided
here is also what is found in latent utility models in econometrics): Let D be a
binary variable where D = 1 if the grower has a PC, and D = 0 if the grower
has an MC. In particular, D = 1 if NMB  0 , and D = 0 if NMB < 0.
Then, Pr(D = 1) = Pr(NMB  0), and since a higher P will raise the NMB
at the corner, this will also raise the probability of having a PC, all other things
remaining the same. Using the same kind of reasoning, the likelihood of input
provision also rises with a fall in the principals costs vk of obtaining the kth
contractible input, other things remaining the same.
Proposition 3.6
The likelihood of input provision under a production contract increases with
an increase in the market premium received per unit of lean percentage, and with
a decrease in the principals cost of obtaining a particular contractible or noncon-
tractible input, other things remaining the same.
The denition for a marketing contract and a production contract as outlined
above captures Coases idea that an institutional arrangement will materialize if
the benets associated with it exceed the costs (Coase, 1991). And, the extent
of input provision, as garnered from the interior solution optimal values obtained
for xc and xNc, reects "limits to rm size" as described by Coase. However,
the analysis of limits to rm size, as reected by the model structure of this
chapter, is not conned to a comparison of costs only - costs of carrying out an
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extra transaction within the rm with the costs of carrying it out in the open
market (Coase, 1937). The analysis here boils down to equating marginal benets
to marginal costs in the neoclassical scheme of things while taking into account
several dimensions of a specic problem in a production theoretic setting.
3.4 Interlinkage in Production Contracts
The characteristic feature of production contracts is the provision of certain key
inputs by the integrator, a phenomenon that is associated with interlinkagein
the development and/or sharecropping literature. Interlinkage can be dened as
the practice of o¤ering contracts that combine transactions over several dimen-
sions (Basu, Bell and Bose, 2000). In the case of PCs, interlinkage involves the
contracting company contracting over not just the outputs (weight gain and/or
output quality) but also some or all of the contractible inputs that it provides.
Interlinkage arises in the context of PCs with the contracting company con-
tracting over weight gain and feed with incentives based on leanness typically
being absent. In what follows, I examine (i) the economic rationale for the ab-
sence of quality based incentives in PCs, and (ii) the optimality of a production
contract where the payment is based both on weight gain and feed usage. The
analysis of (i) and (ii) follows from the analysis of the principals maximization
problem where I assume a linear payment structure for the agent who has CRA
preferences over r.
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3.4.1 Absence of (orWeak) quality based incentives under
production contracts
This section examines conditions under which the contracting company provides
no incentives (or only weak) incentives with respect to leanness or the quality
dimension of output, which is something that is frequently observed in the case
of production contracts. The compensation in a marketing contract involves
providing incentives both with respect to weight gain and quality unlike PCs
where quality based incentives typically tend to be absent.10 To examine this,
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  C(xNc;xc(	);y(	);q(	);h)  gI(xNc)  ug (3.26)





















10I nd no clause that species payments based on quality in the PC samples available
on www.iowaattorneygeneral.org. The same was conveyed in informal conversations with Dr.
James MacDonald (Economic Research Service, USDA), Prof. Kelly Zering (Department of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, North Carolina State University), and a group of broiler
growers.
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+(qs(	)  qi(	))g]2]1=2   C(xNc;xc(	);y(	);q(	);h)  ug  L;
where L is some constant, L 2 <+ and measures the principals expected payo¤
exclusive of his costs of obtaining the noncontractible inputs. The principals
cost function CI(y;q;h;L) represents the principals (ex ante) minimum cost
of producing a given state contingent y;q 2 <S+ given h. An interior solution,
especially for the noncontractible inputs that determine leanness, characterizes a
production contract by denition.
By the principle of conditional optimization, the problem corresponding to
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with   representing the set of parameters (; ;;h; ).


















































































k  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K (3.29)
To examine no incentives (or only weak) incentives with respect to quality, I
assume that:
(a) Quality is nonstochastic - The lean percentage for each state approaches
q, with quality primarily determined by genetics and feed quality. Once genetics
and feed quality are chosen by the integrator, the lean percentage is assumed
to be practically invariant to the state of nature. Since it is the integrators
decisions with respect to genetics and feed quality that are crucial to determining
q, the quality dimension of production is said to be su¢ ciently controlled by the
integrator.
(b) Tasks are technically independent of leanness - Technical independence





= 0;8s; k: As mentioned
earlier, the notion of technical dependence (or independence) described here is
not strictly the same as what is found in the literature (for instance, Holm-
strom and Milgrom, 1991). For tasks to be technically independent of lean-





= 0;8s; k, in the sense of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991), the second-order cross partial derivatives of the growers e¤ort cost func-
tion (in this case, the cross partial derivatives involving leanness-weight gain and
leanness-input use) must be zero. In other words, an increase in leanness should
not a¤ect the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of a state-contingent y
(Cylqs(x
I ;y;q;h) = 0;8l; s 2 S). Similarly, an increase in leanness should not af-
fect the marginal cost of using an extra unit of the contractible input provided by
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the integrator (Cxckqs(x
I ;y;q;h) = 0;8s; k). The concept of technical dependence
or independence in this thesis refers to technical dependence or independence
given the inputs xNc chosen by the principal and complementarity entails taking
derivatives of the objective function F (:) in the agents maximization problem






= 0;8s; k into (3.28), and using the assumption qs =
q;8s 2 S, gives the optimal :
 ! P   CIq (y;q;h;L);
or, in the limit,
 = P   CIq (y;q;h;L)
so that the principal adjusts y; q; and  so as to equate P (the premium associated
with leanness) and his marginal cost associated with an extra unit of q. This
scenario becomes plausible when the principal chooses the optimal q as if he faces
a perfectly competitive market for quality, with the marginal cost schedule given
by CIq (y;q;h;L). In this scenario, the optimal quality is such that the principal
equates price to marginal cost as is the case in a perfectly competitive market.
This, in turn, causes the optimal  to tend to zero. This optimal  corresponds
to the optimal level of leanness that is actually produced by the integrator, but
turned out by the grower in the production process. That is, even though the
quality dimension itself is turned out by the agent, it can be viewed more as a
"free" by-product for the agent that results from the principals e¤ort.
Proposition 3.7
If the noncontractible inputs that determine leanness are provided by the prin-
cipal and (i) quality is nonstochastic, (ii) tasks are technically independent of
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leanness, and (iii) the principal chooses optimal q so that CIq (y;q;h;L) tends to
P , the principal does not provide any incentives (or provides only weak incentives)
with respect to quality so that  = 0 ( ! 0) at the optimum.
Therefore, under PCs, the grower only "turns out" the quality dimension so
that the degree of leanness is realized only at the end of the production cycle
when the grower delivers the animals grown to market weight (which also makes
leanness a potential signal that can be rewarded). However, the major factors
that determine leanness - genetic composition of the animals, and feed quality -
are controlled by the integrator and "programmed" for when the young animals
are delivered to the grower in the beginning of the production cycle. That is,
leanness is e¤ectively produced by the integrator. Overall, input provision by the
integrator, through his investment in genetic composition and feed quality, plays a
key role in explaining the absence of (or weak) quality based incentives under PCs.
This feature of contracting provides an explanation that is di¤erent from what
Holmstrom and Milgrom have for the provision of low powered or no incentives
with respect to a certain task. In the Holmstrom and Milgrom framework, low
powered or no incentives with respect to a certain task are attributed to the
fact that rewarding that task may cause the agent to substitute his attention
away from other tasks especially in a situation where errors associated with the
measurement of the other tasks are large. The conditions obtained here therefore
provide yet another perspective on multitask contracting. Finally, the presence
of quality based incentives in a MC can be attributed to the non-fullment of
any one of the conditions outlines in Proposition 3.7.
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3.4.2 Interlinkage over weight gain and feed in production
contracts
Interlinkage arises in the context of PCs with the contracting company contract-
ing over both weight gain and feed. The picture that emerges is one where the
grower e¤ectively "buys" feed from the integrator.11 In what follows, the opti-
mality of a contract that is based on both weight gain and feed is examined.
To facilitate the analysis of interlinkage in a PC, I restrict attention to the
markets for weight gain and inputs only. The incentives based on leanness are as-
sumed to be absent so that  = 0 as is common in PCs (www.iowaattorneygeneral.org).
It is also assumed that the input market for contractible and noncontractible in-
puts is competitive and that the grower is able to obtain inputs at the same price
as the integrator. Finally, to facilitate comparison, the e¤ort evaluation function,
gI(xNc), of the integrator is assumed to be linear with wj being the integrators
per unit cost associated with the jth noncontractible input. The payment to the
grower in state s is now given by:






















11However, given that incentives in the contract are typically described in terms of the feed
conversion ratio (FCR), the exact payment that the grower makes per pound of feed gets
confounded in practice.
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The rst order conditions (3.19), (3.21) and (3.22), assuming interior solu-


















































I ;y;h)  wj  0;
xNcj  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K; j = 1; 2; ::::J (3.32)
In this context, I examine what corresponds to no interlinkage and if no
interlinkage is optimal. In the case of no interlinkage,
k =  vk; and (3.33)
CxNcj (x
I ;y;h) =  wj
That is, the principal provides the kth contractible input in a way that the grower
e¤ectively purchases that input from the integrator at the market price, instead
of buying it from the market. And, the price that the grower pays for the
kth contractible input equals vk

, the value of vk in period t + 1. At the same
time, when noncontractible inputs are provided under PCs, this leads to a re-
duction in the growers own minimum costs. In the case of no interlinkage, the
growers cost saving CxNcj (x
I ;y;h) associated with the principal directly choosing
an extra unit of the jth noncontractible input exactly equals wj - the principals
per unit cost of buying that input.
83
Now, for the conditions in (3.33) to be consistent with the rst order condi-
tions in (3.31) and (3.32), it is also required that  = 1. However, (3.30) also
needs to be satised along with the rest of the rst order conditions for no inter-
linkage to be optimal. Substituting,  = 1, k =  vk, and CxNcj (x











(ys   yi)]] 6= 0
implying that (3.30) is not satised unless there is no uncertainty with respect to
weight gain and/ or the grower is risk neutral. This implies that the integrator,
in a production contract arrangement with input provision, nds it optimal to
o¤er an interlinked contract.
If the agent is risk neutral and/or there is no uncertainty in weight gain, the
principal o¤ers independent contracts for the di¤erent relevant dimensions, or the
payment for a specic task does not cut across transactions in other dimensions.
That is, the optimality of no interlinkage with respect to weight gain and feed
usage under a production contract is consistent with: (a) the agent being risk
neutral and/or (b) no uncertainty associated with weight gain. Note that non-
fullment of either one of these conditions reduces the marginal benet of raising
 at the margin (in the rst order condition given by 3.30). The principal then
might want to interlink contracts over weight gain and feed so that what is lost
on account of uncertainty due to weight gain, for instance, is made up through
an appropriate charge for feed usage.
Proposition 3.8
Interlinkage over weight gain and contractible inputs is optimal for the prin-




The rationale for input provision, as is common to standard microeconomic the-
ory, boils down to weighing benets against costs at the margin. All relevant
costs and benets are taken into consideration when the principal chooses the
optimal level of inputs to be provided. The case of a marketing (production)
contract with no input provision (input provision) is then characterized by a cor-
ner (interior) solution for the optimal choice of inputs. Moreover, the likelihood
of input provision under a production contract increases with an increase in the
market premium received per unit of lean percentage, and with a decrease in the
principals cost of obtaining a particular contractible or noncontractible input,
other things remaining the same.
With respect to internal organization, the economic rationale for the absence
of quality based incentives in production contracts is examined. This is intended
to provide yet another perspective to the Holmstrom and Milgrom multi-task
model. Interlinkage is also seen as relevant for PCs, with an optimal contract
being based on both feed usage and weight gain.
It will be interesting to see where agriculture is headed with regard to pro-
duction contracts and whether it will mimic the "true" capitalist mode of or-
ganization. As Hunt (2004) notes, the transition to capitalism became complete
when, in the later period of the putting out system, the capitalists started to own
not just the raw materials required for production but also the tools, machinery,
and often the building in which production took place. This was accompanied
by the creation of a large working class that only had its labor power to sell in




Economic Power and Endogenous Reservation
Utility in Corporate Dyads
4.1 Introduction
Reservation utility, or the amount that an agent gets in his next best alternative
use, is a vital component of all principal-agent models. Any contract, in theory,
must o¤er the agent at least his reservation expected utility, in order for it to
be accepted. This then forms the basis for the individual rationality constraint
or the participation constraint in economic modeling. Contracting models, how-
ever, typically take this reservation utility as exogenously given. The possibility
of reservation utility being endogenous has been explored formally in a seminal
paper by Basu (1986), as also in Naqvi and Wemhoner (1995), and Chambers and
Quiggin (2000). All these papers are interesting in that they attempt to incorpo-
rate qualitative issues such as inuence and power that tend to get marginalized
in conventional economic modeling. In particular, it is in the exploitation of
the agent by the principal through extra-contract means within an existing con-
tractual framework in which endogeneity in reservation utility in these papers is
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manifested.
This chapter, in contrast to the studies mentioned above, focuses on pre-
contract (before the contract is signed) or outside-of-contract interactions that
inuence the reservation utility and not extra-contract means within an existing
contractual framework. Moreover, unlike the present literature that emphasizes
the emergence of endogenous reservation utility in triadic relationships, this chap-
ter illustrates that such a possibility may even arise in a dyadic setting.1
As far as the methodology is concerned, I examine the equilibrium determi-
nation of the agents reservation utility in the context of dyadic relationships
involving two rms (I and II) interacting pair-wise. There are two levels of in-
teraction one, under contract where one rm works for another, and second,
before the contract is signed when both rms operate independently. As indepen-
dent producers, both rms compete in a duopoly setting with one rm (rm II)
being relatively smaller, less competitive, and relatively less cost-e¤ective than
the other (rm I). I show that these factors, in turn, make it di¢ cult for rm II
to compete with rm I, thereby reducing its protability of independent produc-
tion. This then may cause the smaller player namely, rm II, to opt for contract
production as an agent with rm I as the "principal" rm. In the contract inter-
action, the principal rm contracts with the agent rm for the production of the
given commodity and the contract is such that it o¤ers the agent no more than
his reservation utility. However, the agents reservation utility now depends on
the price that the agent gets for his product in his outside option under which he
1A triadic relationship is one where two parties interact with each other both directly, and
indirectly, through a third party. This is in contrast to a dyadic relationship where parties act
pairwise.
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produces independently the same product that he would under contract.2 That
is, the agent in his outside option competes with the principal rm as an indepen-
dent but relatively smaller and relatively less cost-e¤ective producer - a situation
modeled as being one identical to the pre-contract phase - and the reservation
utility under contract is a¤ected by this competition on the price front.
In what follows, I rst cite background case studies that illustrate how reser-
vation utility is endogenously determined. Section 4.3 develops and examines the
model for the equilibrium determination of reservation utility - (i) the production
technology, (ii) the determination of reservation utility in a strategic Cournot
duopoly setting, and (iii) an analysis of contract production with endogenous
reservation utility that includes the pattern of input provision, the preference
and return structures of the principal and the agent, the timing of the game, the
set up of the agency problem, the possibility of a hold-up problem, and the three
stage solution to the agency problem. The fourth and nal section concludes.
4.2 Background Case-Studies
The dyadic relationship in this chapter is specically examined in the context
of corporate agrarian contracting in the United States with special reference to
the pork and broiler industries . These industries have undergone signicant
changes over time in their structure of organization. One such structural change
includes increasing concentration of agricultural production in large farms and
the growing inability of the smaller players to compete. Further, as Macdonald
2Note that the "outside" option or the "next best alternative use" that determines reser-
vation utility in this chapter entails rms engaging in independent production as in the pre-
contract phase.
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(2006) argues, The structural upheavals reect, in some and perhaps most cases,
the exploitation of new scale economies...As such, structural change can lead to
lower costs, lower prices to consumers, and higher returns to resource providers;
it also leads to lower returns for those competing producers who do not adapt
to new technologies.The challenge faced by smaller producers is reected in a
1998 New York Times news-item: It is agreed that falling hog prices in 1998,
for instance, are to be mainly attributed to the overproduction of swine.....The
growing dominance of factory-like hog companies makes it increasingly di¢ cult
for smaller, independent operations to compete.(Johnson, 1998).
An illustration of the inability of smaller producers to compete with the larger
players is the case study A contract on hogs: A Decision Caseby Swinton and
Martin (1997) that describes the factors underlying a Michigan farm couples
decision to go for contract production with the company "Pork Partners. This
is a couple that was operating independently - raising hogs outdoors and selling
them to an agent of Michigan Livestock Exchange. However, declining hogs prices
in the late 1980s and the inability to earn the premium o¤ered on the production
of leaner hogs (hogs raised outdoors tend to be fatter) were among the important
factors adversely a¤ecting their prot margins, eventually leading them to opt
for contract production with Pork Partners.
The above facts suggest that the inability to compete with bigger operations
reduces the protability of independent production for smaller players. And,
in this scenario, if the smaller player opts for contract production under the
bigger player, it is the reduced protability under the independent production
arrangement that will constitute the benchmark against which contracts will be
designed.
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It may be noted here that investments of bigger operations may be undertaken
primarily to reduce costs and become more competitive vis-à-vis other players.
The activities need not be directly and "consciously" targeted towards ultimately
getting the smaller players to work under contract. However, the linkages in the
economy may be such as to lead to an outcome of this kind and it is these linkages
that the present chapter explores.
Another case in point is Wal-Mart that is well-known for having acquired a
key competitive advantage by not only investing heavily in cutting-edge technol-
ogy but doing so faster than any of its competitors. Wal-Marts strength lies in
the relatively low prices that it charges as compared to its competitors compris-
ing supermarkets and local mom and popstores. Its low cost culture reects
a market philosophy and can be attributed to several factors such as purchas-
ing goods in bulk directly from manufacturers instead of relying on wholesalers,
constantly innovating and improving its IT infrastructure, and so on. Overall,
low prices can be attributed to the scale and scope e¢ ciencies that Wal-Mart has
invested in. (Friedman, 2005; Basker, 2007)
However, low prices charged by Wal-Mart and other retail chains have also
received considerable attention on account of the di¢ culty they pose for the small
players to compete. The company has also come under scrutiny for its low wages
and benets. The demise of several mom and pop stores has been attributed to
their inability to match Wal-Mart prices. Goetz and Swaminathan (2004) suggest
that one of the options available to such storeowners (and their employees) once
they shut down is to work for Wal-Mart itself. If contracts pay no more than
the reservation utility, the Wal-mart contract with this former store owner or
employee will o¤er him no more than the new reduced income that results from
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the stores inability to compete.
The possibility of reservation utility being endogenous can also be seen in the
context of business takeovers. This is especially true for those takeover decisions
triggered by the target rms inability to compete with the leading rms (includ-
ing the acquiring rm) on account of falling prices. An example of a takeover in
this genre is the takeover of Indias Ranbaxy, a family owned business, by the
Japanese rm Daiichi Sankyo in 2008. Ranbaxy, in its early years of operation,
was able to take advantage of lax patent protection and enjoy scale economies in
the manufacture of generic drugs. What proved to be its undoing was its decision
to develop original drug compounds - an aspect with respect to which India has
not yet come of age. On the generic front too, it has been facing competition
from smaller, more nimble rms (Sheth, 2008).3 The Ranbaxy Chief Executive
O¢ cer (CEO), also a part of the family that owned the pharmaceutical company,
sold his entire stake in the company, and initially agreed to continue working as
the CEO. He, however, stepped down as Ranbaxy Chief soon thereafter presum-
ably because the overall scheme of things after the takeover may not have been
satisfactory enough.
As a matter of fact, one can argue that the pork contract example in the
Swinton and Martin study would e¤ectively amount to a takeover by the con-
tracting company in corporate parlance (especially when the contract in question
is a production contract). However, the takeover is indirect in the sense that
even though there is no shift of ownership or voting rights, the decision making
authority largely shifts to the contracting company. While the land and other
3Note that this example di¤ers from the examples cited above in that competition was posed
by smaller (and not larger) rms.
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assets continue to be owned by the farmer, it is the company that makes the key
production decisions and e¤ectively determines how assets will be used.
Denition 4.1
A (production) contract takeover is the taking over of control and/or manage-
ment of a rm under a contract without there taking place a transfer of "shares"
or ownership of the rm.
The case studies discussed above are illustrative of the fact that reservation
utility may be endogenously determined within the model. In all the exam-
ples discussed above, the opportunity cost of an agent is lowered on account of
increased competition on the price front under independent operation. This, in
turn, implies that factors that reduce prices (e.g. reduced costs and/or large-scale
production) should benet the integrator (in the context of the thesis model). The
specic benet that I focus on is the fact that reduced costs and the associated
mass production by the integrator lead to a downward pressure on prices which,
in turn, lower the reservation utility of the smaller player(s), thereby inducing
him to go for contract production but getting paid the lower reservation utility.
And, restricting attention to only two players, one can view a production con-
tract as involving the more competitive rm taking over the operations of the
less competitive rm (without a transfer of formal ownership of assets), and the
owner of the latter accepting a contract to work with the former.
Now, endogenous reservation utility has been examined in the context of tri-
adic relationships by Basu (1986). In this context, Basu notes: A transaction
that leaves one agent actually worse o¤ can be explained in a model with ra-
tional agents only if we allow for triadic relationships.However, in the light of
the discussion above and in what follows formally in this chapter, endogenous
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reservation utility:
- is seen to emerge in a dyadic setting where parties interact pairwise in a
strategic manner. As a matter of fact, the scenario in Basu can also be seen
in terms of a dyadic relationship if, for example, one allows for the landlord
to legally enter into a partnership with the merchant (or even take over the
merchants business) and then o¤er his contract and the merchants goods to the
laborer as a package. Even though the outcome will be the same as that in Basu,
the means to achieving that outcome seem part of normal economic behavior!
- may not be a consequence of a coercivethreat but may be a consequence
of the exertion of economic power (or, in more extreme situations, economic
coercion).4
The scenario outlined in this chapter is also di¤erent from that described
in the context of the traditional landlord who takes the market price as given
with a rise in market price causing him to increase his exploitative activities
which, in turn, lead to a fall in the peasants reservation utility (Chambers and
Quiggin, 2000). However, I show, in this chapter, that there are two ex post price
schedules that need to be taken into account: 1) the market price that results
from the interaction between economic players in the pre-contract phase, and
(2) the market price that results when the smaller player decides to work under
contract for the larger player. In particular, for the case in question, what is
relevant is a rise in the pre-contract market price, also endogenously determined,
a rise in which now leads to a rise in the farmers reservation utility.
4Whether a situation is interpreted as threatening (and therefore subject to antitrust legis-
lation) or as part of regularrational economic behavior can be a subjective issue and depends
on the legal and/or moral evaluation of the situation by the adjudicating authority.
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4.3 Model
Suppose there are two players - I and II, and currently II works (as the agent)
for I (the principal) under contract - production contract or marketing contract,
depending on whether or not there is input provision. This is the status quo and
was preceded by player II operating, like player I, as an independent producer.
While the contract is such that it pays II no more than his reservation utility,
this reservation utility is no longer exogenous as is the case in standard moral
hazard models. In particular, it is assumed that the reservation utility of the
agent in this model is determined in a strategic Cournot duopoly setting where
both I and II make their production decisions simultaneously and independently.
Note that the organizational structure (in terms of independent production
followed by contract production for player II) is taken as a "given" in contrast to
the rst part of the thesis where the organizational structure (in terms of input
provision) was endogenously determined.5 The focus in this chapter is on the
equilibrium determination of reservation utility given a specic organizational
form.
4.3.1 The Production Technology
In this chapter also, I continue with the same production technology specication
as in Chapter 3 except that only one output (z) is produced, where z represents
weight gain or output quality. There are M xed inputs denoted by h 2 <M+
(e.g. land area devoted to production), and N variable inputs with the variable
input vector represented by x 2 <N+ . The non stochastic inputs are committed
5An alternative organizational structure may be one where rm II, who initially produces
independently, simply opts to work in rm II as an employee.
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prior to the resolution of uncertainty. Uncertainty entails Nature, a neutral
player, making a choice from among two mutually exclusive states. Let the set of
states of nature be represented by 
 = f1; 2g. Such a set serves to highlight the
uncertain aspects of production such as those relating to temperature, disease
and the biological or metabolic processes in animals. Let 1; and 2 be the
probabilities with which states 1 and 2 occur, respectively.
The production technology is described in terms of the input correspondence
X(z1; z2;h) that consists of the sets of variable inputs that can produce a particu-
lar state-contingent output vector z = (z1; z2)2 <2+ given a vector of xed inputs
(h). Note that the input correspondence in no way determines which state of
nature corresponds to high output and the state that corresponds to low output.
It is, therefore, assumed, without loss of generality, that the relative probabilities
are such that state 1 is the good state.
Assumption 4.1
It is assumed, without loss of generality, that state 1 is the good state.
The sequence of moves that govern production on the "eld" is as follows: A
grower, given h, rst commits a vector x of non stochastic inputs to production
that allows him to produce a vector of state-contingent outputs, (z1; z2)2 <2+,
with the typical element being zs, where zs represents the amount of output that
is realized in state s (s = 1; 2). Nature then makes a draw from 
 which, along
with x, determines the output zs, corresponding to the state s that materializes.
For the complete structure and timing of the game, see Section 4.3.3. It is
assumed, as before, that both growers are cognizant of the technology and each
others preferences.
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4.3.2 Determination of reservation utility in a Cournot
Setting
The reservation utility of the agent is determined by what he gets in his next best
alternative use which is characterized here by the agent operating independently
as grower II, and competing with grower I (who, under contract, acts as the
principal). The situation outside of the contract is modeled in terms of a state-
contingent Cournot duopoly model where the parties concerned are assumed to
engage in independent production and act simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
This is in contrast to cooperative behavior where the equilibrium concept is based
on the Nash bargaining solution (See Appendix G).
To see the exact mechanism under which the growers interact, denote grower
i0s production by (zi1; z
i
2), i = I; II, corresponding to the two states of nature.
Let zI1 + z
II




2 = Z2 with Zs representing the total production of
the two rms taken together in state s; s = 1; 2. Suppose, the market price is no
longer exogenous as was true for Chapter 3 but is given by the inverse demand
function P (Zs) for state s. In particular, P (Zs) is assumed to be linear and is
given by P (Zs) = 1  Zs; s = 1; 2:
Grower i (i = I; II) receives a gross amount ris = P (Zs)z
i
s in state s; s = 1; 2.
It is assumed that grower I is risk neutral and his preferences over r are of the
linear form 1rI1+2r
I
2 : Grower IIs preferences over rare based on the expected














where u : < ! < represents the utility function of the agent. The utility function
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is strictly increasing and strictly concave so that the agent is strictly risk averse
over state-contingent returns. I specically address the case of constant risk
averse (CRA) preferences for grower II so that:













1   P (Z2)zII2 ];
using Assumption 4.1 where r1 > r2. Here,  is the index of risk aversion, and









Let gi(x) : <N+ ! < be the e¤ort-evaluation function for grower i (i = I; II)
under the organizational arrangement characterized by independent production.7
The function gi(x) gives grower i0s (i = I; II) evaluation over a particular in-
put bundle x 2<N+ chosen by him. It is assumed that gi(x) is nondecreasing,
continuous, and convex for all x (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000). Let Ci(z1; z2)
represent grower i0s variable cost function that reects the (ex ante) minimum
cost of producing a given state contingent (z1; z2)2 <2+ given h. It reects the
growers cost minimizing choices of x, and is dened as:
Ci(z1; z2) = min
x
fgi(x) : x 2 X(z1; z2;h)g;
6Note that CRA preferences are consistent with the expected utility model only under risk
neutrality.
7Note that the e¤ort evaluation function under independent production namely, gi(x) reects
a cost structure that is di¤erent from the one that is outlined in the second half of the model that
characterizes contract production. The rationale for this is that the organizational structures
are "givens" in this model and not endogenously determined so that cost structures may di¤er
depending on the pattern of production that producers engage in. The case where the cost
structures coincide is a special case within this more general set-up that allows for di¤erent
cost structures.
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if there is an input vector x 2<N+ that can produce a given z and 1 otherwise.
In particular, I assume a linear cost function that is characterized by constant







2 for grower I, and
CII(zII1 ; z
II




2 for grower II.
It is assumed that rm I is the more cost e¤ective rm and has a distinct cost
advantage so that c1 < d1, and c2 < d2.
The model below examines strategic interaction between two players - (1)
Firm I represented either by an individual grower producing independently or
a contracting company, and (2) Firm II who is an individual grower producing
independently. The players make their output decisions simultaneously and in-
dependently in a state-contingent Cournot framework. In each state, each rm
maximizes expected returns and chooses its optimal output based on its conjec-
ture of what the other player does.8 This then determines a reaction curve for
each rm, and the reaction curves for the two rms simultaneously determine
the mutual best response in state-contingent outputs that constitute the Nash
equlibrium. The state-contingent market price is then determined by the inverse
demand function, assuming that demand equals the total quantity produced by
the two rms.
Grower IIs optimization problem, given the state-contingent output choices
8In particular, each rm acts as the monopolist over its residual demand.
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2 )  CII(zII1 ; zII2 ):





1u((1  zI1   zII1 )zII1 ) + 2u((1  zI2   zII2 )zII2 )  CII(zII1 ; zII2 ):
Assuming an interior solution, the rst order conditions are given as follows:
zII1 : 1u




2 ) = 0
zII2 : 2u




2 ) = 0:
In order to be able to get a specic expression for the reservation utility so as
to facilitate analysis in the second half of the model, I assume CRA preferences
for grower II and a linear cost function. With CRA preferences and a linear cost





1(1  zI1   zII1 )zII1 + 2(1  zI2   zII2 )zII2   
p
12[(1  zI1   zII1 )zII1  
 (1  zI2   zII2 )zII2 ]  d1zII1   d2zII2 :
Assuming an interior solution, the rst order conditions are:
zII1 : (1   
p
12)(1  zI1   2zII1 )  d1 = 0
zII2 : (2 + 
p
12)(1  zI2   2zII2 )  d2 = 0:
9It is assumed that for both growers, the joint evaluation over the input vector x, and over
the receipts r are separable.
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The reaction functions for grower II corresponding to states 1 and 2; respec-
tively, as derived from his rst order conditions, are represented as:












Now, looking at grower Is maximization problem (with a linear cost function





1(1  zI1   zII1 )zI1 + 2(1  zI2   zII2 )zI2   c1zII1   c2zII2 :
The corresponding state-contingent reaction functions for grower I in states 1
and 2, respectively, are obtained from:








Solving (4:1) and (4:3) simultaneously for the optimal state-contingent out-























As can be seen from the results above, grower II 0s optimal state-contingent
output is decreasing in its own marginal cost in state 1, and increasing in grower
I 0s marginal cost c1:The same kind of argument holds for grower I but we are
concerned here with grower II and his returns in each state, as his expected
returns from this game are assumed to determine his reservation utility under
contract.
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Similarly, by solving (4.2) and (4.4) simultaneously, we get the optimal pro-























Substituting the results obtained in (4.5) - (4.8) into the expression for grower
II 0s expected payo¤ gives:
1(1  zI1   zII1 )zII1 + 2(1  zI2   zII2 )zII2   
p
12[(1  zI1   zII1 )zII1  
 (1  zI2   zII2 )zII2 ]  d1zII1   d2zII2
The expression above is the expected reservation utility of grower II if he decides
to produce under contract for grower I and is represented as10:

































1 > 0 if (1   
p
12) > 0































This then leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1
A reduction in grower I 0s marginal cost in state 1 and/or state 2 causes
a decline in grower II 0s expected payo¤ and therefore his expected reservation
utility.

























That is, the equilibrium market price is nondecreasing in the growersstate-
contingent marginal costs. The situation illustrated here is di¤erent from that
described in the context of the traditional landlord who takes the market price as
given with a fall in market price causing him to decrease his exploitative activities
and leading to a rise in the peasants reservation utility. In particular, for the
case in question, a fall in price (now endogenously determined) through, say, a
reduction in grower Is marginal costs c1 and/or c2 results in a fall in reservation
utility. However, note that the market price that drives the result here is the ex
post price that results from the strategic interaction between the two economic
players while they are producing independently. This price need not be the same
as the price that results from contract production with the larger rm as the
residual claimant. Overall, this analysis shows that a landlord can bring about
a reduction in the expected reservation utility of the agent through a fall in the
market price achieved by focusing attention on cost reducing investments. That
is, the same outcome - a fall in the expected reservation utility - may result even
when one is not engaging in unproductive exploitative activities.
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Corollary 4.1
A reduction in the equilibrium outside-of-the-contract market price on account
of a reduction in grower I 0s marginal cost in either state or both states leads to
a decline in grower II 0s expected payo¤ and therefore his expected reservation
utility.
4.3.3 Contract Production with Endogenous Reservation
Utility
Once grower II decides to produce for grower I under contract, the relationship
between the two growers changes from one involving strategic interaction in a
Cournot duopoly to one where grower I is the principal and grower II becomes
the agent, as is the case in a principal-agent problem. With the main competitor
having become the agent, Grower I now acts as a monopolist in the market for
pork or chicken. Note that while the players acting in an independent capac-
ity compete noncooperatively outside of the contract situation, the game under
contract is such that the agent (grower II) now makes his decisions in light of
the decisions made by the principal or the provisions outlined under the formal
contract. Thus, the nature of the game switches from a non-cooperative game
to a leader-follower game with grower I being the leader and grower II the fol-
lower. As a matter of fact, grower I can also be viewed as being equivalent to the
contracting/integrator company that has been the main focus of attention with
respect to marketing and production contracts in the thesis.
The game is assumed to span two periods. That is, inputs committed today
(time t) produce state-contingent output zt+1s in the next period corresponding
to state s. For the ensuing analysis, the time superscripts associated with zt+1s
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will not be written explicitly unless it is necessary to do so. Following from
Assumption 3.1 in Chapter 3, both the principal and the agent are assumed to
have the same subjective discount factor .
Pattern of Input Provision under Contract
As is true for Chapter 3, I allow for input provision by the principal in the
model as this is an essential feature of the contracts in question. To allow for the
possibility of di¤erent patterns of input provision, the vector of inputs x 2 <N+ is
decomposed into two components - the inputs provided by the grower-agent, and
the inputs provided by the integrator-principal. Let xG2 <N+ and xI2 <N+ denote
the input bundles provided by the grower and the integrator, respectively, with
xG+ xI = x. Following from Denition 3:2, the contract is a marketing contract
if it is characterized by xI = 0, and a production contract if xI  0;xI 6= 0.
The vector of inputs provided by the integrator-principal is further decom-
posed into two components, xc and xNc, where:
xc : represents the vector of inputs that the principal contracts upon with
the agent (e.g. feed quantity), with contractibility depending on the input being
observable and veriable, and
xNc : represents the vector of noncontractible inputs provided by the principal




375 with xNc 2 <J+ and xc 2 <K+ ; J + K = N . In terms of
this decomposition, a PC is characterized as one where xNc  0;xNc 6= 0;xc 
0;xc 6= 0 while an MC is dened as one where xNc = 0, xc = 0.
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Preference and Return Structure of the Principal
From the point of view of the principal, the observables in this problem are the
inputs provided by him (xI), if any, and the output z. While xI and z constitute
the observables, the state of nature and the agents decisions with respect to
the self provided inputs cannot be observed. Thus, it is only the agent who
can observe the conditions under which production takes place once (and if) the
inputs are delivered to him by the principal. It is assumed that the agent is a
rational cost minimizer and that the principal has no direct preferences over the
agents decision variables in xG. That is, what the principal cares about are the
cost minimizing choices of xI and his return from z.
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral and maximizes his expected return.
The production structure that he wants to implement is (z;xc),that is, (zs;xc)
in a particular state s. Let gI(xNc) : <J+ ! < be the e¤ort-evaluation function
for the principal that gives his evaluation over a particular input bundle xNc2<J+
directly chosen by him. It is assumed that gI(xNc) is nondecreasing, continuous,
and convex for all xNc (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000). The market price is given
by the inverse demand function P (zs) for state s, assumed to be linear and given
by P (zs) = 1   zs; s = 1; 2:, and the per unit cost to the principal associated
with the input vector xc is reected by the vector v 2 <K++. Thus, the principals
gross return from z and xI in state s (gross of payments made to the agent) is





k   gI(xNc); s = 1; 2; k = 1; 2; ::::K.
Preference and Return Structure of the Agent
The ex post payments made by the principal to the agent (grower II) under
contract are represented by rII1 and r
II
2 for states 1 and 2, respectively. To simplify
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the notation, I use r1 and r2 to represent the agents state-contingent receipts
as in Chapter 3. Thus, rs represents the agents gross return when (zs;xc) is
realized. It is assumed that the agents joint evaluation over self provided inputs
and contract payment received in period t+ 1 is given by:
W (r)  gG(xG;xI);
where  is the agents subjective discount factor that captures impatience, and
W (r) represents the preference function over r. The agents preference structure,
is constant risk averse of the form:
r   [r]
= 1r1 + 2r2   
p
12[r1   r2];
Moreover, under contract production, and after allowing for the possibility
of input provision, the agents e¤ort evaluation function is given by gII(x) =
gG(xG;xI) : <N+ ! <. Further, gG(xG;xI) : <N+ ! < is the e¤ort-evaluation
function that gives the growers evaluation over a particular input bundle, xG2 <N+ ,
given xI . From this, I obtain the growers variable cost function under contract
production C(xI ; z1; z2;h) that reects the (ex ante) minimum cost of producing
a given state contingent (z1; z2) 2 <2+ given h and xI . It reects the growers cost
minimizing choices of xG given xI and h, and is dened as:
C(xI ; z1; z2;h) = min
xG
fgG(xG;xI) : x 2 X(z;h)g;
if there is an input vector x 2<N+ that can produce a given z and1 otherwise. It
is assumed that the production technology is such that it guarantees the existence
of a cost function that is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly convex in state-contingent outputs (Chambers, 2002). To facilitate the
analysis, I make the following assumption:
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Assumption 4.2
Suppose that C(xI ; z1; z2;h) is positively linearly homogeneous in the state-
contingent outputs.
Game Structure and Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
The timeline of the game shown in Figure 4.1 indicates that as an independent
producer, grower I makes investments (included in the vector h) that a¤ect:
(a) its state-contingent marginal costs c1 and c2 as an independent producer,
(b) its costs under contract (specied as a function of c1 and c2, and incor-
porated formally in the model below). In particular, let the function f(c1; c2)
represent the benets from grower Is investments that are carried over into con-
tract production through the parameters c1 and c2, in the form of, say, economies
of scale. The function f(:) is assumed to be decreasing and concave in the state-
contingent marginal costs, and
(c) grower IIs reservation utility that is also a function of c1 and c2, as
reected in equation 4.9. That is:


























In both (b) and (c), the impact of the investments is indirect and is chan-
neled through (a). This is because investments a¤ect c1 and c2 which, in turn,
impact both costs under contract and the agents reservation utility. Thus, the
technology allows for a direct mapping from a xed long-term investment onto
the variables c1 and c2, and investments are made accordingly. For instance, hog
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Grower I undertakes investments to realize ;, 21 cc
Grower I (Principal) offers contract
to grower II (Agent); specifies state-
contingent payments and chooses
input vector x Nc
  Agent accepts or rejects offer
If agent accepts, Principal delivers Ix
Agent commits input vector x
to produce 21, zz
Uncertainty resolved - Nature





Investments and corresponding choice of 21 ,cc
affect reservation utility of grower II.
to the agent
Payments made as per contract
agreement and game ends
Figure 4.1: Timing of the Game
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or bird growing time, and therefore variable costs (whether production is under-
taken independently or under contract), have reduced considerably on account of
considerable research and develoment undertaken by an integrator company
Once the investments are in place, grower I, in his capacity as the principal,
o¤ers grower II - the agent, operating independently prior to contracting - a
take-it-or-leave-it contract that species the state-contingent payments and the
principals decisions (implemented once the contract is accepted) with respect to
the noncontractible inputs xNc. It is assumed (as in Chapter 3) that the agent
has full information about the principals decision of xNc and that there is no
hidden action problem with respect to xNc. Contracts, in practice, do not clearly
specify what the exact choices of the noncontractible inputs will be. However,
such information may be gleaned through repeated contracting or from other
agents who have earlier contracted with the same company or, as revealed by
some broiler growers, from the company itself. In any case, this is information
in a broad sense - for instance, it is possible for the agent to obtain information
about the animal breed but not each and every detail relating to the genetic
composition, or its possible to know the di¤erent grades of feed but not details
about each and every nutrient.
Based on the o¤ered state-contingent payments and the principals choice
of the noncontractibles, the agent accepts or rejects the contract. If the agent
accepts the o¤er, the principal delivers the contractible and the noncontractible
inputs.11 Once the inputs are delivered by the principal, the agent commits the
11The inputs are actually delivered after a lag of a few months during which actual arrange-
ments are made for input provision. For the purpose of modeling, this act is clubbed with other
activities in time period t. It is also assumed that choices of noncontractible inputs are made
as per the investment decisions made in the beginning of the game, and that the lag of a few
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input vector x = xG + xI to produce (z1; z2). At time t + 1, Nature makes a
draw from one of the two states that, along with x, determines a vector of state-
contingent outputs, zs, corresponding to the state s that Nature chooses. The
principal is the residual claimant or the legal owner of the product produced by
the agent.
4.4 Analysis of the Agency Problem
The second-best agency problem can be stated in terms of the following maxi-
mization problem for the principal:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
r;z;xI ;c1;c2





k   gI(xNc) + Af(c1; c2)
subject to :
[1r1 + 2r2]  k
p
12[r1   r2]  C(xI ; z1; z2;h)  E2(c1; c2) (IR)
z1; z2;x
c 2 argmaxf[1r1 + 2r2]  k
p
12[r1   r2]  C(xI ; z1; z2;h)g (IC)
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
[A]
where E2(c1; c2) is the expected reservation utility obtained from (4:9), and
P (z1) = 1  z1, and P (z2) = 1  z2 with grower I acting as the monopolist and
total output being determined by what is produced under contract. The function
f(c1; c2) represents the benets from grower Is investments that are carried over
into contract production through the parameters c1 and c2, in the form of, say,







I(xNc) gets scaled down by Af(c1; c2), with
A > 0. That is, the parameter A represents a benet scale factor that scales up
benets of contracting indicated by f(c1; c2) by a strictly positive amount.
The IR constraint, as before, states that the agent must receive at least
months does not a¤ect the commitments made in the beginning.
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his expected reservation utility in order for him to accept the contract. The
constraints as outlined by (IC) are the incentive constraints, and ensure that
the agent nds it privately rational to choose the state-contingent output vector
and contractible input levels that the principal would like to implement. In
what follows, an alternative but equivalent specication to the agency problem
is employed as nonlinear programming methods can then be used to facilitate
the desired comparative statics associated with the main issue being addressed
(see Chambers and Quiggin, 2000). This alternative representation of the agency
problem requires the principal to pay to the agent an amount r1 if z1 is realized,
r2 if z2 is realized, and if any output other than z1 or z2 is reported by the agent,
an arbitrarily large ne is imposed on him.











[1r1 + 2r2]  
p
12[r1   r2]  C(xI ; z1; z2;h)  E2(c1; c2) (IR)
[1r1+2r2] 
p
12[r1  r2] C(xI ; z1; z2;h)  r1 C(xI ; z1; z1;h) (IC1)
[1r1+2r2] 
p
12[r1  r2] C(xI ; z1; z2;h)  r2 C(xI ; z2; z2;h) (IC2)
[1r1 + 2r2]  
p
12[r1   r2]  C(xI ; z1; z2;h)  [1r2 + 2r1]  
p
12[r2   r1]
 C(xI ; z2; z1;h) (IC3)
where (IR) represents the agents individual rationality constraint or his partici-
pation constraint. The incentive compatibility constraints that make it incentive
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compatible to choose the state-contingent output vector as desired by the prin-
cipal are given by (IC1)  (IC3).
To see that this specication leads to the same solution as the one given in [A],
suppose the solution to the second best problem in [A] is given by (z1 ; z

2):Now,
if the solution (z1 ; z

2) is anything other than the vector (z1; z2) that the principal
would like to implement as is true for the alternative specication, the agent
would have to bear the arbitrarily large penalty. Assuming that the penalty
approaches 1, and that u( 1) !  1, it will never be rational for the agent
to choose anything but (z1; z2) that coincides with (z1 ; z

2).
4.4.1 The Agency Problem and the Possibility of a Hold-
up
A possiblity of a hold-up or an asset specicity problem for grower I may arise once
his xed investments are in place. Hold-ups or asset specicities arise in situations
where an installed asset may become so specialized to suit the requirements of
a particular party that it may have little or no value in an alternative use. An
illustration, in this context, is a situation where grower I undertakes investments
in animals and ensures their timely delivery to the agent. However, the agent
may decide to hold up the principal by refusing to undertake production unless
certain demands, say, a fee increase, are met. If the principal is not able to nd
other suitable agents that have made the necessary arrangements to undertake
production as per his requirements, he then faces a hold-up problem.12
12Grower II, in the capacity of the agent, also faces a potential hold-up problem (See section
3.2.5). Theoretically, this situation may be reected in the agents optimization problem in the
same manner as what is described for the principal below in Proposition 4.2.
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As also proposed in Section 3.2.5, a hold-up situation may be factored into
the problem by considering the hold-up case as the outcome of a particular state
of nature. That is, there are four possibilities that arise in the framework of
the given model. These are given by the cartesian product of the sets {state 1,
state 2} as described by the model above, and {hold-up, no hold-up) - that is,
(state 1, hold-up), (state 1, no hold-up), (state 2, hold-up), (state 2, no hold-up).
The possibility of a hold-up is, therefore, a part of the uncertain portfolio that
is associated with any production problem and this needs to be reected in the
optimization problem. Moreover, since a hold-up is related to xed assets in
which grower I invests, this aspect is tackled in terms of the benet scale factor
A. In particular, I dene a hold-up situation as one that is associated with A
(and therefore Af(c1; c2)) approaching  1. This then leads to a modication
of the principals optimization ptoblem where his expected payo¤ becomes  1
in the event of a hold-up. In this scenario, the principal can be assumed to take
recourse to legal measures, or one can even allow for renegotiation, or else the
principal can look for alternative outlets for undertaking contract production. In
any case, the outcome is  1. And, if no hold-up occurs, the principals expected
return is determined by the solution to the program as outlined originally:8>>>>><>>>>>:
max
r;z;xI ;c1;c2





k   gI(xNc) + Af(c1; c2)g
subject to :




The solution to the second-best agency problem is represented by: (a) the
optimal value to the program [B], if no hold-up occurs, and (b)  1, if a hold-up
113
occurs.
Now, let CI(z;h) be the principals cost function derived as:




IR; IC1   IC3;
where CI(z1; z2;h) is the principals cost function that represents the principals
(ex ante) minimum cost of producing a given state contingent z 2 <S+ that also
satises the (IR) and the (IC) constraints. After introducing the principals cost










[1r1 + 2r2]  
p
12[r1   r2]  C(xc; z1; z2;h)  E2(c1; c2) (IR)
[1r1+2r2] 
p
12[r1  r2] C(xc; z1; z2;h)  r1 C(xc; z1; z1;h) (IC1)
[1r1+2r2] 
p
12[r1 r2] C(xc; z1; z2;h)  r2 C(xc; z2; z2;h) (IC2)
[1r1 + 2r2]  
p
12[r1   r2]  C(xc; z1; z2;h)  [1r2 + 2r1]  
p
12[r2   r1]
 C(xc; z2; z1;h) (IC3)
In this standard, no hold-up case, the model is solved as a three-stage game
where grower I rst undertakes investments to choose and realize a cost structure
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dened by c1 and c2.13 Grower I then, in the capacity of a principal o¤ers a
contract to grower II (the agent) and chooses the state-contingent payments r1
and r2, given c1 and c2, corresponding to outputs z1 and z2 that are to be produced
by the agent. Finally, given r1 and r2 (and c1 and c2), the grower chooses inputs
xc, and the state contingent output vector (z1; z2). In all stages, the optimal
choices are made so as to maximize net returns of the party concerned.
The model is solved as follows: In the rst stage, the principal chooses optimal
r1 and r2, subject to the participation and incentive constraints, to minimize the
present discounted value of the expected payment associated with implementing
a given z1; z2; and xc. The second stage involves the optimal choices of z1; z2;
and xc that are to be implemented through the contract, given the solution from
the rst stage. The third and nal stage uses the solutions from the rst and the
second stages to examine the principals optimal choice of c1 and c2 (reecting
his xed investments) which, in turn establishes the optimal level of the agents
reservation utility.
4.4.2 The First-Stage Problem and Agency Cost func-
tions
In the rst stage, the principal chooses r1 and r2 to minimize the dicounted
expected payment made in time period t+ 1:
f(1r1 + 2r2)g
subject to
13The analysis in terms of a three stage game is similar to the Grossman and Hart (1983)
formulation of the moral hazard problem as a two stage game.
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[1r1 + 2r2]  
p
12[r1   r2]  C(xc; z1; z2;h)  E2(c1; c2) (IR)
[1r1+2r2] 
p
12[r1  r2] C(xc; z1; z2;h)  r1 C(xc; z1; z1;h) (IC1)
[1r1+2r2] 
p
12[r1 r2] C(xc; z1; z2;h)  r2 C(xc; z2; z2;h) (IC2)
[1r1 + 2r2]  
p
12[r1   r2]  C(xc; z1; z2;h)  [1r2 + 2r1]  
p
12[r2   r1]
 C(xc; z2; z1;h) (IC3)
As in Chapter 3, the (IR) constraint for the agent holds with an equality
so that the contract, at the optimum, pays the agent exactly the value of his
reservation utility. To see this, consider the IC constraints expressed as:
(2 + 
p
12)(r2   r1)  C(xc; z1; z2;h)  C(xc; z1; z1;h) (IC 01)
(1   
p
12)(r1   r2)  C(xc; z1; z2;h)  C(xc; z2; z2;h) (IC 02)
(1   2   2
p
12)(r1   r2)  C(xc; z1; z2;h)  C(xc; z2; z1;h) (IC 03)
The constraints (IC 01)  (IC 03) are illustrative of the fact that they are invariant
to the principal reducing payments by an equal amount in both states. Thus,
if the (IR) constraint does not bind, the principal can reduce payments in both
states until it does bind, and increase his own expected return without a¤ecting
any of the (IC) constraints.
The solution to the rst stage problem denes the second-best agency cost
function Y (z1; z2; 2; c1; c2) that gives the principals minimum cost of implement-
ing a given state-contingent output vector (z1; z2) by the agent subject to the
116
condition that the (IR) and the (IC) constraints be satised. Since the agents
participation constraint binds exactly, the information from this constraint can
be used to dene a lower bound to the principals objective function. To see this,
consider the binding (IR) constraint expressed as:
[1r1 + 2r2] = E2(c1; c2) + C(x
c; z1; z2;h) + 
p
12[r1   r2]
This, in turn, implies,
[1r1 + 2r2]  E2(c1; c2) + C(xc; z1; z2;h)
The above inequality then establishes E2(c1; c2) + C(xc; z1; z2;h) as the lower
bound to the principals objective function.
In what follows, I show that among the (IC) constraints, (IC1) and (IC

3)
are satised by an (IC2) that holds with an equality. To see this, suppose (IC

2)
binds exactly. This then implies:
r1   r2 =





To see if (IC1) is satised, consider the following inequality implied by (IC

1):
r1   r2 




Substituting for r1   r2 from (4.11) gives:
















c; z2; z2;h) C(xc; z1; z2;h)  0
(4.12)
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Thus, (IC1) will be satised by a binding (IC

2) if the inequality in (4.12) is
satised. This relationship indeed holds - Multiplying (IC1) by (1   
p
12)
and (IC2) by (2+
p
12), and adding the terms, shows that (4.12) is implied
by (IC1) and (IC

2).
Now, multiplying (IC1) by (2 + 
p
12) and (IC2) by (1   
p
12),
and adding the terms, gives:
(1   
p
12)r1 + (2 + 
p












Clearly, the left hand side of the above inequality is the same as those for any
one of the (IC) constraints as it is generated as a linear combination of (IC1)










12)r1 + (1   
p








 (2 + 
p
12)r1 + (1   
p
12)r2   C(xc; z2; z1;h)




c; z1; z1;h) + (1   
p
12)C(x
c; z2; z2;h)  C(xc; z2; z1;h)
(4.13)
Since (2 + 
p
12) = 1   (1   
p
12), the left hand side of (4.13) is
nothing but a convex combination of C(xc; z1; z1;h) and C(xc; z2; z2;h). Also,




c; z1; z1;h) + (1   
p
12)C(x












Further, it follows from Assumption 4.2 where C is positively linearly homo-










 C(xc; z2; z1;h) (4.15)
In words, (4.15) will hold if it is less costly to produce the same output (2 +

p
12)z1 + (1   
p
12)z2 in each state than to report z2 in state 1 and z1
in state 2. Then, assuming that (4.15) holds, (4.14) and (4.15) together imply
that (4.13) will also be satised.
Given that (IR) and (IC2) bind exactly, the second-best agency cost function
can now be obtained by solving (IR) and (IC2) simultaneously for r1 and r2.
In particular, the expressions for r1 and r2 are:
r1 = E2(c1; c2) + C(x
c; z2; z2;h) +





r2 = E2(c1; c2) + C(x
c; z2; z2;h)
Thus, the expression for the second-best agency cost function is given by:






[C(xc; z1; z2;h)  C(xc; z2; z2;h)]g
Proposition 4.3
The second-best agency cost function Y (z1; z2; 2; c1; c2) is strictly increasing
and linear in the expected reservation utility E2(c1; c2), with YE2 = , so that the
minimum cost of implementing a given state-contingent output vector increases
with an increase in E2(c1; c2), by the discount factor .
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4.4.3 The Second-Stage Problem
The second stage of the principals optimization problem is formulated as:
U(c1; c2; v; ) = Max
z;xc





k   CI(z1; z2;h) 
 Y (z1; z2; 2; c1; c2)g
Substituting the expression for the second-best agency cost function from
equation (4.16) into the objective function above gives:
Max
z;xc





k   CI(z1; z2;h) 





[C(xc; z1; z2;h)  C(xc; z2; z2;h)]g g
The following proposition then follows from the envelope theorem:
Proposition 4.4
For a given E2(c1; c2), the optimal value of the second-stage agency problem
U(c1; c2; v; ) is strictly decreasing and linear in the expected reservation utility
of the agent.
4.4.4 The Final-Stage Problem and the Equilibrium De-
termination of State-Contingent Marginal Costs
In the nal stage of the contracting problem, the principal chooses the optimal
levels of state-contingent marginal costs as an independent rm which, in turn,




fU(c1; c2; v; ) + Af(c1; c2)g
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where U(c1; c2; v; ) is the optimal value of the second-stage objective function.
Suppose, the optimal values in this stage of the optimization problem are given
by c(A) dened as:
c(A) 2 argmaxfU(c1; c2; v; ) + Af(c1; c2)g
Employing standard comparative static techniques yields:
[A   A][f(c1(A); c2(A))  f(c1(A); c2(A))]  0
That is, if A  A, then f(c1(A); c2(A))  f(c1(A); c2(A)). In other words, as
the benet scale factor A increases, the principal will have a stronger incentive to
undertake higher initial investments so as to realize a lower c in each state. This
follows from the assumption that the function f is monotonically decreasing in
c.
Proposition 4.5
An increase in the benet scale factor leads to a fall in the marginal cost in
each state for the independently operating principal which, in turn, leads to a fall
in the expected reservation utility for the agent.
The proposition above and proposition 4.3 can be used to infer the following,
formally stated as a corollary:
Corollary 4.2
A reduction in the expected reservation utility E2(c1; c2) unambiguously works
to the advantage of the principal, all other things remaining the same. It is,
therefore, in his interest, to adopt measures that enable him to realize a fall in
E2(c1; c2).
A natural fall-out of the principals e¤ort (in terms of his xed investments)
to reduce his variable costs as an independent operator is a decline in the agents
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expected reservation utility. And, once an independent grower opts for contract-
ing, the principals optimal decisions of c1 and c2 then accrues to the principal as
indirect benets through (a) a fall in the principals expected payment, and (b) a
rise in the principals optimal net expected returns. This result holds as long as
the parameter A has no direct impact on the principals expected payment and
his net optimal expected returns. Formally, it follows from propositions 4.3, 4.4,
and 4.5 that:
Corollary 4.3
(a) The expected payment to the agent is nonincreasing in the benet scale
factor A. Moreover, (b) the principals optimal net expected returns U(c1; c2; v; )
from the second-stage problem are nondecreasing in A.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the role of outside-of-contract dyadic interactions in the
equilibrium determination of reservation utility. Prior to or outside contracting,
the agent and the principal compete as independent producers, and investment
decisions taken by the principal (as the larger, more competitive rm) to reduce
its own costs adversely impact the smaller players expected returns. This works
to the advantage of the principal as it is the reduced returns of the smaller player
that form the benchmark against which any contract will be designed in the
event of the smaller player deciding to produce under contract for the larger
player. Benets of initial investments undertaken by the larger producer also get
carried over into contracting in the form of economies of scale. The higher these
benets, the stronger is the incentive for the principal to decide in favor of higher






This dissertation examines input provision as the chief organizational charac-
teristic of production contracts in contrast to no input provision in marketing
contracts, in the context of corporate agriculture. Input Provisionis modeled
so as to reect:
- the provision and delivery of key inputs by the principal,
- purchases of inputs by the principal (from the spot market or under con-
tract), or in-house production, and
- contract design to ensure the optimal use of those inputs by the agent.
I examine input provision through a state-contingent principal-agent model
in a production theoretic setting. This production-theoretic state-contingent ap-
proach has the advantage that it allows for a su¢ ciently general production tech-
nology and the modeling of multiple outputs (weight gain and leanness) and
inputs.
The choice variables in question are the levels of inputs (e.g. feed, genetic
lines, and medication) that the principal (e.g. the contracting company) pro-
vides and delivers to the agent (the grower). This decision is endogenous to the
model, and facilitates comparison of production contracts (characterized by input
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provision) with marketing contracts (characterized by no input provision, with
all inputs purchased and/or provided by the grower himself). The inputs that
can be potentially provided by the principal are categorized into contractible and
noncontractible inputs for the purpose of analysis, where contractiblerefers to
an input being observable and veriable. Input dimensions that are contractible
include, for example, the number of pounds of feed used by the grower. These
aspects are explicitly contracted upon and enter into the payment scheme for the
grower. Inputs such as feed quality fall under the category of noncontractibles.
These are inputs whose usage the principal cannot verify, and nds it very costly
to contract upon. Therefore, these inputs do not gure in the payment scheme.
My theoretical model formalizes Coases idea that an institutional arrange-
ment will materialize if the benets associated with it exceed the costs. In par-
ticular, I characterize the case of no input provision as a corner solution for the
optimal choice of inputs (contractible and noncontractible). That is, there is an
incentive for the principal to provide inputs under a production contract if, at the
boundary, where no inputs are provided, the marginal benets of input provision
exceed the marginal costs. And, the extent of input provision, as garnered from
the interior solution optimal values obtained for a production contract, reects
"limits to rm size" as described by Coase. The analysis of limits to rm size,
as reected by the model structure of this chapter, reects a comparison of costs
in the Coasian sense - costs of carrying out an extra transaction within the rm
with the costs of carrying it out in the open market (Coase, 1937). In particular,
the analysis here boils down to equating marginal benets to marginal costs in
the neoclassical scheme of things while taking into account several dimensions of
a specic problem in a production theoretic setting.
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Moreover, the likelihood of input provision under a production contract in-
creases with an increase in the principals market premium per unit of the quality
dimension of output, and with a decrease in the principals costs of obtaining a
particular contractible or noncontractible input, other things remaining the same.
I also make a preliminary attempt to model transaction costs within the frame-
work of a general state-contingent theoretical model. Transaction costs in this
thesis include both neoclassical production costs and costs associated with nego-
tiating and administering an ongoing production relationship as is also true for
the analysis by Joskow (1985). The cost minimization problems of the principal
and/or the agent are, therefore, modeled so as to include not only the direct
costs of purchasing inputs but also consideration of possible costs that arise in
the process of carrying out transactions relating to the production process. To
this end, the e¤ort evaluation function that gives the evaluation over a particular
input bundle chosen by the principal or the agent is assumed to be convex so that
the evaluation over each input can vary linearly or non-linearly with the amount
of input used. While the linear formulation entails the purchase of inputs that
are in perfectly elastic supply and/ or where any additional costs incurred per
unit are a constant, I argue that a general non-linear formulation allows one to
capture a more realistic cost structure. Even though the world of transaction
costs may be "complex" and di¢ cult to identify for the outsider, such costs are,
nevertheless, taken into account by the agent who is assumed to be a rational
cost minimizer. I introduce and illustrate this idea through a series of examples
outlined in Section 3.2.5.
Moreover, Chapter 3 explores the possibility of input provision in PCs leading
to what is known as "interlinkage" in the development literature. Interlinkage
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refers to the practice of o¤ering contracts that combine transactions over several
dimensions (Basu, Bell and Bose, 2000). Thus, as applied to the case in ques-
tion, it refers to the contracting company superseding individual markets and
contracting over several aspects like feed, weight gain, and so on. In particular,
interlinkage in this dissertation is seen to emerge as a means of dealing with an
aversion to risk and/or uncertainty in production.
A special case in the context of interlinkage or the lack of it is one where
incentives with respect to a particular contractible dimension are absent or low-
powered - that is, there is absence of interlinking with a particular contractible
input or output. In Chapter 3, technical conditions are derived under which,
in a production contract, incentives relating to one of two output dimensions
(leanness) tend to zero when both dimensions (weight gain and leanness) are ob-
servable and veriable.12 These conditions reect the considerable control that
the principal has over the output dimension for which no or weak incentives are
provided leanness programmed into the animals by the integrator when they
are delivered in the beginning of the production cycle, and exhibiting little or
no variability among di¤erent states of nature; other tasks in production being
technically independent of leanness; and the principal choosing the optimal lean
1This is in contrast to the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) multi-task model where all tasks
cannot be suitably measured. The authors attribute low-powered or no incentives with respect
to a certain task to the fact that rewarding that task may cause the agent to substitute his
attention away from other tasks. This is especially true for a situation where errors associated
with the measurement of the other tasks are large so that the other tasks cannot be observed
and veried easily.
2Incentives with respect to leanness are absent in PCs as against MCs where quality based
incentives are important.
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percentage in a perfectly competitive set-up. The essence of this result is that
even though leanness itself is turned outor delivered by the agent when it is
realized at the end of the production cycle, it can be viewed more as a "free"
by-product for the agent that is e¤ectively produced by the principal and results
from the principals e¤ort. This then does away with the need to provide incen-
tives with respect to leanness in a production contract.The result here provides
a rationale for missing incentives that has not been captured in the literature on
contracts and organization.
The technical analysis in Chapter 4 titled Economic Power and Endogenous
Reservation Utility in Corporate Dyads explores the possibility of reservation
utility being endogenous in the framework of the model developed in Chapter 3.
This chapter illustrates that irrespective of the pattern of input provision that
emerges under contract, there is always a distinct possibility of reservation utility
becoming endogenous on account of out-of-contract interactions. There are two
points of deviation from the existing literature rst, where endogenous reser-
vation utility emerges in a dyadic setting (unlike the existing literature that em-
phasizes triadic relationships), and second, where outside-of-contract, perfectly
legitimate economic interactions (rather than extra-contract exploitative means
within an existing contract set-up, as is true for the existing literature) inuence
reservation utility.
The specic kind of outside-of-contract interaction that is examined in this
thesis involves the principal rm (rm I) and the agent rm (rm II) interacting
prior to contracting as independent producers in a Cournot duopoly setting. It is
in this Cournot duopoly setting, where both rms make their production decisions
simultaneously and independently, that reservation utility is determined. The
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principal rm is assumed to be the larger, more competitive, and more cost
e¤ective party both under contract and prior to contracting.
Moreover, prior to contracting, rm I makes investment decisions once and for
all, and these decisions benet it both directly and indirectly: There are benets
that accrue to it directly through a reduction in production costs as an indepen-
dent producer, and indirectly when the benets are carried over into contract
production. At the same time, however, such investments and the resulting fall
in costs and market prices may make it di¢ cult for the smaller player rm II,
to compete and therefore, result in reduced protability for rm II in the pre-
contract phase. One option available to the smaller player, in the face of reduced
protability, is to opt for contract production with rm I as the principal rm. In
this event, however, it is the (induced) reduced returns of the smaller player that
form the benchmark against which any contract will be designed and constitute
an indirect benet for the principal from his investments. In this chapter, there-
fore, I formalize both the direct and the indirect benets of xed investments
undertaken by the principal. The main result of this chapter is that the higher
the benets associated with the initial investments, the stronger is the incentive
for the principal to decide in favor of higher levels of such investments so as to
realize a more competitive position with respect to the smaller producers. More-
over, a production contract arrangement between the two rms is likened to a
takeoverby the principal of the control and/ or management of the agent rm
without there taking place a transfer of ownership.
The scenario outlined in Chapter 4 is di¤erent from that described in the
context of the traditional landlord who takes the market price as given with a
rise in market price causing him to increase his exploitative activities which, in
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turn, lead to a fall in the peasants reservation utility (Chambers and Quiggin,
2000). However, I show, in this chapter, that there are two ex post price schedules
that need to be taken into account: 1) the market price that results from the
interaction between economic players in the pre-contract phase, and 2) the market
price that results when the smaller player decides to work under contract for the
larger player. For the case in question, what is relevant is a fall in the pre-contract
market price, also endogenously determined, on account of a fall in marginal cost
of the larger, more competitive player. The corresponding fall in market price,
in turn, leads to a fall in the smaller players expected payo¤ and, therefore,
reservation utility.
Finally, the possibility of a hold-up problem for the principal rm is also ex-
plored and the strategy of incorporating this problem into the economic model
is discussed wherein a hold-up corresponds to the outcome of a particular state
of nature. The possibility of a hold-up is part of the uncertain portfolio that
is associated with any production problem, and the optimization problem has
to be suitably modied to reect this. In particular, the solution to the princi-
pals optimization problem in the event of a hold-up is one where his expected
payo¤ becomes  1, in which case he is assumed to take recourse to legal mea-
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Graphical Representation of Preferences (EU
and CRA) in two-state space
Expected Utility:
W (r1; r2) = 1u(r1) + 2u(r2)
Along an iso-preference curve,
dw = 1u0(r1)dr1 + 2u0(r2)dr2 = 0






as u0(:) > 0.








] > 0 (B2)
as the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly concave and dr2
dr1
< 0.
From (1) and (2), it follows that the iso-preference curves under the expected





Figure B.1: Expected utility preferences
Constant Risk Aversion:
The CRA preference structure in the two-state case is given by:
W (r) = r   [r];
where r is the mean income equal to 1r1+2r2; and  is the standard deviation
associated with r. Note that:
2[r] = E(r   Er)2
= 1(r1   Er)2 + 2(r2   Er)2
= 1(r1   1r1   2r2)2 + 2(r2   1r1   2r2)2
= 1(2r1   2r2)2 + 2(1r2   1r1)2
= 1
2
2(r1   r2)2 + 212(r2   r1)2
= 12(r1   r2)2(2 + 1)
= 12(r1   r2)2 (since 2 + 1 = 1)
The standard deviation associated with r is obtained by taking the positive
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square root of the expression above. Therefore,
[r] =
p
12 j r1   r2 j
which, in turn implies that:
W (r) = 1r1 + 2r2   
p
12 j r1   r2 j
That is,
W (r) = (1   
p
12)r1 + (2 + 
p
12)r2 , r1  r2 (B3)
= (1 + 
p
12)r1 + (2   
p
12)r2 , r1 < r2
Thus, if r1  r2, the slope of the iso-preference curve is given by:
dr2
dr1






< 0; (1   
p
12) > 0 (B4)
and if r1 < r2, the corresponding slope is:
dr2
dr1






< 0, (2   
p
12) > 0 (B5)
















the straigh line segments on the right side of the bisector where r1  r2 will be





Figure B.2: CRA Preferences
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Appendix C
Monotonicity of Payments in Observed Output




S) represent the optimal
pattern of state-contingent production with zS  zS 1  ::::  z2  z1 and






S) over another output
vector such as (z1 ; z







S) involving production of z

l 1 in both states
l and l   1 implies (For compactness, the arguments of C(xI ;y;q;h) have been

















c))g C(xI ; z1 ; z2 ; :; zl 1; zl 1; zl+1; :::zS;h)




c))  u(rl 1(zl 1;xc))]  C(xI ; z1 ; z2 ; :::zS;h) 
 C(xI ; z1 ; z2 ; :; zl 1; zl 1; zl+1; :::zS;h) > 0
the last inequality following from the assumption that costs are strictly increasing




c))  u(rl 1(zl 1;xc))] > 0
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implying that payments are monotonic in observed output.
To examine the possibility of disincentives associated with excessive leanness,
suppose that the agents cost function is not everywhere increasing in state-
contingent ouputs. In particular, let costs decrease if q  q given y, where q is
some constant and q 2 <+. I assume that weight gain y is the same irrespective
of the state so as to focus only on the quality dimension of output, . Moreover,
suppose ql  ql 1; l 2 S with ql 1 < q < ql.





































c))  u(rl(y; ql ;xc))]  C(xI ; y; q1; q2; :::qS;h) 
 C(xI ; y; q1; q2; :; ql ; ql ; ql+1:::qS;h)













S;h) and l 1 >




c))  u(rl(y; ql ;xc))] > 0











Comparative Statics for the Agent
The su¢ cient conditions for the monotone comparative statics with respect to






=  Cyml ymb (x














00(rl)  CypIl qpIl (x






=  lu00(rl) + CypIIl qpIl (x






=  CypIl qpIb (x
I ;y;q;h)  0; l; b 2 SpI ; l 6= b (D4)
1(D3a) and (D3b) allow for yl and ql to be in the same and di¤erent groupings, respectively,














=  CqpIl qpIb (x













00(rl)  CqpIl xc;pIk (x





=  bku00(rb)+CypIIb xc;pIk (x





=  CxpIi xpIk (x
I ;y;q;h)  0; i; k 2 KpI ; i 6= k (D10)
@2F (a;;h)
@( ypIl )@





00(rb)yb  0; b 2 SpII (D12)
@2F (a;;h)
@( qpIl )@







00(rs)ys  0; k 2 KpI (D14)
The su¢ cient conditions for the monotone comparative statics with respect
to the set [( yI; qI; xc;I...qII); ] are given by (D1, with m = I),
(D4), (D7), (D8), (D10) with pI = I and pII = II, and the conditions (D14)







00(rl)  CypIl qpIl (x






=  lu00(rl) + CypIl qpIIl (x














=  Cqml qmb (x













=  lku00(rl)+CqpIIb xc;pIk (x
I ;y;q;h)  0; b 2 SpII ; k 2 KpI (D18)
@2F (a;;h)
@( ypIl )@
=  lu00(rl)ql  0; l 2 SpI (D19)
@2F (a;;h)
@( qpIl )@





00(rb)qb  0; b 2 SpII (D21)
2(D14a) and (D14b) allow for yl and ql to be in the same and di¤erent groupings, respectively,








00(rs)qs  0; k 2 KpI (D22)
The set of conditions under which ( yI; qI; xc;I...xc;II) increases
with k is given by (D1, with m = I), (D3a), (D4), (D6), (D7), (D8), and





=  lku00(rl)+CypIl xc;pIIk (x





=  lku00(rl)+CqpIl xc;pIIk (x





=  Cxmi xmk (x








(xI ;y;q;h)  0; i 2 KpI ; k 2 KpII (D26)
@2F (a;;h)
@( ypIl )@k
=  lu00(rl)xck  0; l 2 SpI (D27)
@2F (a;;h)
@( qpIl )@k


























k  0; k 2 KpII (D30)
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Appendix E
First Order Conditions for the Agent
The growers optimal choices under a linear payment and CRA preferences are
characterized by the following rst order conditions:













 Cyl(xI ;y;q;h)  0; yl  0; i; l; s 2 S (E1)













 Cql(xI ;y;q;h)  0; ql  0; i; l; s 2 S (E2)
xck : k   Cxck(x
I ;y;q;h)  0; xck  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K (E3)
in the notation of complementary slackness.





























 Cql(xI ;y;q;h)  0; ql  0; i; l; s 2 S (E5)
xck : k   Cxck(x
I ;y;q;h)  0; xck  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K (E6)
CLAIM: In (E4) and (E5) above, l[
P
i6=l






i(rs   ri)] = 0
PROOF(by induction):











= 1[2(r1   r2)] + 2[1(r2   r1)] = 0











= 1[2(r1   r2) + 3(r1   r3)] + 2[1(r2   r1) + 3(r2   r3)] +
















i(rl   ri)] +
X
s 6=l














i(rm   ri)] +
X
s 6=l 6=m












Continuing in this way S   1 times gives the desired result. C.E.D.
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Appendix F
Optimization Problem (General Payment
Scheme)
For a more general payment scheme such as one in which rs =  + ps (where 
is a xed transfer and ps(ys;qs;xc) is a state-contingent incentive payment), the




















sps)  T 1=2   C(xI ;y;q;h)  u (IR)





k   gG(xG;xI)g (IC)
: x 2 X(y;q;h)



























































I ;y;q;h)  0;
xck  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K



































































 0; xNcj  0; k = 1; 2; ::::K; j = 1; 2; ::::J
148
Appendix G
Determination of reservation utility -
Cooperative Case
Suppose that, instead of deciding quantities noncooperatively, the two growers
make their decisions cooperatively. The solution concept used in what follows
is the Nash Bargaining Solution. Suppose, the bargaining strengths of the two
growers are given by  and 1  , respectively. Let the disagreement payo¤s, in
which case cooperation breaks down, be given by the outcome of the Cournot
noncooperative game (Binmore, 1999). That is, the disagreement payo¤s are




[1   E1][2   E2]1 
where i   Ei represents the surplus from cooperation for player i in excess of
the disagreement payo¤ Ei. That is, the bargaining problem is given by:
max
z1;z2





12)(1 zI2 zII2 )zII2  d1zII1  d2zII2  E2]1  (G1)










































2 d2  0; zII2  0 (G5)






That is, the surplus over and above the disagreement payo¤ for each player is
assumed to be divided among the players in the ratio of their bargaining strengths.
The rst order conditions (F2) - (F5) are therefore goven by:




1 + 1(1  2zI1   zII1 )  c1  0; zI1  0 (G6)




2 + 2(1  2zI2   zII2 )  c2  0; zI2  0 (G7)
zII1 : (1   
p
12)(1  zI1   2zII1 )  1zI1   d1  0; zII1  0 (G8)
zII2 : (2 + 
p
12)(1  zI2   2zII2 )  2zI2   d2  0; zII2  0 (G9)




12   d1)(21   
p
12)  2(1   
p
12)(1   c1)





(1   c1)(21   
p
12)  21(1   
p
12   d1)




(2   d2)(22 + 
p





(2   c2)(22 + 
p








2 ; and z
II
2 can then be plugged into 2 to
obtain the expression for the expected reservation utility that results from Nash
bargaining.
Assumption: Suppose that grower I has all the bargaining power so that
 = 1.




1(1  zI1   zII1 )zI1 + 2(1  zI2   zII2 )zI2   c1zI1   c2zI2   E1
The corresponding rst order conditions are:
zI1 : 1(1  2zI1   zII1 )  c1  0; zI1  0 (G10)
zI2 : 2(1  2zI2   zII2 )  c2  0; zI2  0 (G11)
zII1 :  1zI1  0; zII1  0 (G12)
zII2 :  2zI2  0; zII2  0 (G13)












Thus, all production is carried out in the lower cost rm (rm I). In fact, this
is excatly what would happen if this were a multi-plant monopoly where both
rms were managed by grower I. E¢ ciency would dictate that all production be






























In this set-up, to facilitate cooperation, grower I would compensate grower II
an amount in the interval [E2;1   E1], with E2; E1 given by expressions (4.9)
and (4.10), respectively. That is, grower I must atleast assure grower II of his
disagreement payo¤ in order to get the latter to agree to give up production. And,
this compensation will not exceed the surplus 1 E1 that grower I achieves out
of the cooperative arrangement.
Clearly, if there is a fall in c1 and/or c2, the expected prots 1 and E1 for
grower I will rise, and E2 will fall. Suppose
@(1 E1)
@cs
 0; s = 1; 2. This then
implies that a fall in c1 and/or c2 will provide a stronger incentive for grower I to
get grower II to shut down operations and enter into a cooperative arrangement,
while paying out not more than the new reduced disagreement payo¤ to grower
I.
As a matter of fact, the analysis under the assumption where grower I has
all the bargaining power is a special case of a principal-agent problem where the
principal contracts with the agent, assures him of his or her reservation utility,
but requires him to put in zero e¤ort (by shutting down his operation).
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